

JPRS-UMA-84-074

29 November 1984

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

29 November 1984

USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

Editorial Outlines Party's Goal (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Oct 84).....	1
Relations Between Commander, Party Organizations Discussed (Sh. Nurullin; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 6, Jun 84).....	4
Party-Political Work During Exercises Discussed (B. Yamshanov; SOVIET MILITARY RIEVIEW, No 8, Aug 84).....	8

WARSAW PACT

MSU Kulikov on Arms Race (V. Kulikov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 6, Jun 84).....	11
---	----

ARMED FORCES

Lt Gen Volkogonov on U.S. Nuclear Policy (D. Volkogonov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 6, Jun 84).....	16
Dep Min Education Shtykalo on New School Reforms (F. Shtykalo; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 14, Jul 84)..	20
Need for Highly-Qualified, Well-Rounded Officers Stressed (Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Sep 84).....	26
Benefits for Reserve, Retired Officers Outlined (V. Vandyshev; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 9, May 84)..	29
New Regulations on Materiel Responsibility (Ye. Samoylov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 9, May 84)..	33

Conflict Between Commander, Unit Discussed (O. Falichev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Aug 84).....	36
GROUND FORCES	
Non-Adherence to Training Schedules Criticized (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Aug, 4 Sep 84).....	41
Distractions Lower Training Level, by V. Zhitarenko Poor Firing Scores Explained, by N. Khaust	
Units' Night Gunnery Training Results Criticized (I. Esyutin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 Oct 84).....	46
Preparation for Company Tactical Exercise (L. Merzlyak; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 6, Jun 84).....	49
Tank Captain Describes Company Training (SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 6, Jun 84).....	53
'Envelopment,' 'Turning Movement' Described (SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 6, Jun 84).....	57
Conditions, Problems in Motorized Rifle Division Discussed (V. Bogdanovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Aug 84).....	59
Search Operation Exercise Described (M. Romanov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 8, Aug 84).....	62
Company Tactical Exercise Described (L. Merzlyak; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 8, Aug 84).....	65
Battery Commanders Now Younger, Less Experienced (V. Zababurin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Aug 84).....	68
AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES	
Editorial Calls for Increasing Pilots' Technical Skills (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Sep 84).....	71
Better Adherence to Training Schedule Called For (Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 Aug 84).....	74
Outstanding Pilot Profiled (S. Levitskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Oct 84).....	77
NAVAL FORCES	
Correspondent Reports From Soviet Warships in Mediterranean (Aleksandr Prokhanov; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 19 Sep 84).....	79

Performance Levels Tied to Crew Indifference (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11, 20 Sep 84).....	87
---	----

Ship's High Rating Lost, by V. Shirokov
Infighting, Indifference Cost Rating, by M. Lukanin

Poor Training, Officer Preparation Cited (N. Shinkarenko, N. Litkovets; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Sep 84).....	93
---	----

Outstanding Submarine Commander Profiled (V. Fedorov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Aug 84).....	96
---	----

Training of Line Officer for Command Described (N. Remizov, A. Kolesnikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 Aug 84)....	99
---	----

SPECIAL TROOPS

Motor Vehicle Repair Workers Criticized (V. Grishin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Sep 84).....	101
---	-----

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Creative Work in Military Schools Discussed (A. Safronov, A. Kiselyov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 8, Aug 84).....	104
---	-----

Entry Announcement for Moscow Military Political Academy (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Oct 84).....	107
--	-----

AFGHANISTAN

Work of Soviet Nurses in DRA Described (A. Tarasov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 Oct 84).....	109
--	-----

MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

EDITORIAL OUTLINES PARTY'S GOAL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 84 p 1

[Lead editorial: "Party Training"]

[Text] The new training year has begun in universities of Marxism-Leninism, schools for the Party aktiv, and all other elements of the system for party training, economic education and komsomol political education in the Soviet Army and Navy.

Fulfilling the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenum, political organs and party organizations display constant concern about improving the effectiveness of all forms of Marxist-Leninist education of communists and the non-party aktiv. A central place in the training process is occupied by study of the concepts of developed socialism, materials of CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the proposals and conclusions contained in the speeches of Comrade K. U. Chernenko, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The scientific level of classes has been raised; more attention has begun to be devoted to studying the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin; the link between training and life has been strengthened; and the training material base has been improved. Many political organs and party organizations in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany, the Belorussian and Moscow military districts and the Baltic Fleet are thoughtfully and creatively approaching the organization of party training.

Great and responsible tasks face political organs and party organizations in the new training year. They are to ensure more complete accomplishment of party instructions on forming a scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook in the students, and raising the level of their political consciousness, vigilance and public activeness, and their readiness to make a maximum contribution to strengthening the combat readiness of units and ships. In this effort it is very important to take into account the specific features of the coming period: preparation for the forthcoming 27th Party Congress and for the 40th Anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

It is important to use ably party training system classes to disclose the true causes of the growth of international tension, and reveal the aggressive, anti-national essence of imperialism, and the militant policy of the American administration toward confrontation, undermining the strategic military balance of forces, and world domination. Particular attention should be paid in the

course of studies to showing the fundamental advantages of real socialism and its social and spiritual values, to rebuffing imperialist ideological sabotage of against the USSR and the other socialist countries, and to a well-argued unveiling of the reactionary essence of bourgeois ideology. The ever greater increase in the number of propaganda faculties, and the higher quality study of the courses, "Developed Socialism," and "Urgent Problems of the Contemporary Ideological Struggle," facilitate solving these tasks in the universities of Marxism-Leninism.

Important tasks of the training year just beginning are to ensure a high scientific level of training, a close link with the practical questions of the life and activity of the troops, the further strengthening of military, labor and self-discipline, and an increase in combat readiness.

In economic training, the students' attention should be concentrated on studying the key problems of increasing the effectiveness of production and growth of labor productivity, and more completely using production capacity and the accomplishments of science and technology. Improving planning and administration, introducing progressive forms of labor organization and incentives, and carrying out economic experiments occupy important places in training. For these purposes it is necessary to better use practical exercises; learn to analyze economic activity in one's work place; compile and defend individual and brigade plans for improving labor productivity, and individual accounts of economy measures; substantiate socialist commitments and counter-plans; analyze specific situations; and prepare abstracts and proposals for improving management.

Lessons conducted in the system of komsomol political education are characterized by thorough assimilation and accomplishment of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled, "On Further Improving Party Guidance by the Komsomol and Increasing its Role in the Communist Education of Young People," and implementation of instructions contained in the speech of Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries.

The propagandist has been and remains the main figure in the system of party training and economic education. His task is to ensure the clarity of world outlook and methodological discipline of each lesson, and to arm communists and non-party activists with Leninist methodology for analyzing social phenomena, and the ability to apply it in practice and define correctly one's role in fulfilling party instructions.

The training of propagandists in the Moscow Military District is instructive in this regard. Here a constant search goes on for ways to improve the effectiveness of political education. At meetings of propagandists at the start of the new year, a thorough analysis was made of the accomplishments of universities of Marxism-Leninism and of schools and seminars of party training and economic education. At the same time, ways to improve the work of scientific and methodological councils and faculties in universities of Marxism-Leninism,

increase the social and political activeness of students, and ensure the practical thrust of analyses and examinations were examined.

The success of training also largely depends on the students themselves, their activeness and desire for knowledge. Communists involved in individual independent study of Marxist-Leninist theory deserve substantially more attention. Success here depends on well organized control of studies, timely assistance of consultants, and high-quality lectures, seminars and conferences on problems of revolutionary theory and party and government decisions.

The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenum defined a broad range of problems related to increasing decisively the effectiveness of all forms of training and changing the style of political education. Persistent and purposeful work to improve the quality and effectiveness of party studies and economic education will best serve the cause of mobilizing communists and the non-party aktiv to solve the tasks of military and political training and economic activity, and will strengthen military and labor discipline and improve combat readiness.

9069

CSO: 1801/17

MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMANDER, PARTY ORGANIZATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 6, Jun 84 pp 30-31

[Article by Colonel Sh. Nurullin: "The Commander and the Party Organisation"]

[Text] Party organisations exist and function in most companies, in every battalion and equivalent subunits, and in all units and ships of the Soviet Armed Forces. What are their relations with the commanders? How do they organise their work under one man command?

Soviet commanders are of the flesh and blood of their people. They are faithful sons of their people. As such they are boundlessly devoted to the Homeland and the Communist Party. They are adequately trained for their jobs as commanders of subunits and units. They use their rights and powers to effectively organise the combat training and political education of the officers and men under them. The commander is responsible for the constant combat readiness of his unit, or ship, for the combat training and political education, for the level of military discipline and morale of his personnel.

A distinguishing feature of one man command in the Soviet Armed Forces is that it is exercised on the basis of the Party spirit. In his work the commander of a unit (subunit) relies on the support of the Party organisation. As a member of the Communist Party he directs the work of the Party organisation in pursuit of the combat training missions, and plans for combat training and political education. One of the tasks of the Party organisation is to strengthen one man command. The Party organisation takes an interest in every aspect of the life and duties of the given unit or subunit and exercises an influence on them. Another task of the Party organisation is to reveal the shortcomings in the training and education of the personnel and help the commander rectify them.

In his Report to the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organisations (held in 1982) Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry F. Ustinov, the USSR Defence Minister, analysed the relations between the commander and the Party organisation. He said:

"In accomplishing the tasks they face the Party organisations must spare no pains to cement one man command, to give support to exacting commanders and to uphold their prestige. In turn the commander must lend an ear to the

view of the Party organisation, to the opinion of the Communists. He must take advantage of their experience and knowledge to rally the military collective, to create a healthy moral climate in it. He must employ the power wielded by the Party organisation to achieve the goals set for his unit (subunit), he must rely on it in his work and set an example to his men in the field of socio-political activity."

A commander who is a Communist is also a member of the Party organisation. As such he enjoys the same rights as his Party comrades. As a Communist he is obliged to be active in Party work and strictly observe Party discipline, which is obligatory for all members of the CPSU regardless of their previous services and the posts they hold. The decisions of Party meetings and meetings of the Party bureau are equally binding on him and all other members of the given Party organisation. Communists have the right to criticise at Party meetings the commander for shortcomings in his work and personal behaviour. What cannot be criticised is only his orders and commands. In the army and navy the commander's order has the force of law.

In the unit (subunit) it is the deputy commander for political affairs that is directly responsible for the organisation of Party-political work.

The establishment of close contacts between the commander and his deputy for political affairs is an imperative condition for success in the work of the Party organisation. Here is an example.

Major Alexander Yershov is the commanding officer of an advanced tank battalion in the Northern Group of Forces. He is a competent officer equipped with political, military and technical knowledge. Major Alexander Yershov, Major Georgy Roshkovsky, his deputy for political affairs, and Captain Sergei Krivospetsky, secretary of the Party organisation, have arrived at an understanding, and they display a common approach to the accomplishment of tasks in combat training and political education. The commander displays an interest in the life of the Party organisation. He keeps the Communists abreast of the achievements and shortcomings in combat training and political education. When he assigns missions, he regularly asks them for advice and takes their suggestions into account.

Once the battalion was to take part in a tactical exercise. As always the preparations for it were discussed at a Party meeting. Major Yershov reported on the matter. He dealt in detail with the measures the Communists were to carry out. He paid special attention to developing high morale in the tankmen and a desire to exceed the proficiency standards normally required of them. The decision of the meeting urged the Communists to mobilise all the personnel to display maximum efficiency and proficiency in the field.

After the meeting Major Yershov and his deputy for political affairs invited the young officers, sergeants and Young Communist League activists to discuss the principal questions bearing on the preparations for the exercise. They also dealt with the measures to be fulfilled in pursuit of the proposals the Communists had made at the Party meeting.

The purposeful, concerted efforts of the commander, his deputy for political affairs, the Party and YCL organisations produced positive results. The battalion was given excellent marks for its performance at the exercise.

Major Yershov takes an active part in the work of the Party organisation. Over a period of several years he has been elected member of the Party bureau. He reads reports at Party and YCL meetings and at meetings of the Party bureau. Just like all other Communists he carries out Party assignments. Thus, in pursuit of a Party bureau decision he conducted a talk with the Party and YCL activists on the decisions of the November 1983 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the Ninth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet (Tenth Convocation).

Captain Krivospetsky regularly informs the commanding officer on the work of the Party organisation and asks his advice on what questions bearing on training and education should be brought to the attention of the Party bureau and Party meeting and what should be done to carry out the decisions effectively. Major Yershov always finds time to hear the views and suggestions of the secretary of the Party organisation and any other Communists. He always orients them on the key questions of educational work the Party organisation should conduct in pursuit of the given combat training mission. The activists and all Communists of the subunit in general have learnt from concrete experience that the commander has competently exercised his right (granted by the Instructions to the CPSU Organisations in the Soviet Army and Navy) to direct the work of the Party collective.

The battalion Party organisation has helped the commander improve the level of the training and educational process. The Communists set a personal example to all the other men in combat training and political education and also in the performance of their regular service duties. In this way they command prestige and exercise influence over the men. All the members and candidate members of the CPSU have excellent achievements in combat training and political education and all have high ratings. The companies, platoons and crews they are in command of are excellent subunits. The men have come to realise that the Communists owe their achievements to self-denying, persistent, and purposeful effort. The tankmen try to do as the Communists do. They are mastering the secrets of the trade with equal diligence. The Communists willingly help their non-Party comrades, if they happen to run into difficulties. In the socialist emulation movement the battalion holds the first place in the regiment.

Major Yershov, battalion commander, says:

"The Party organisation exercises a strong influence on all the aspects of work of the personnel, it builds up their morale, cohesion and promotes team-work. In invariably feel and appreciate its support and assistance. Without the Party organisation we could have hardly achieved the results that we have."

The relations between the commander and the Party organisation are built on a sound, principled Party basis. They are characterised by single purpose, united action and understanding. This style of work is predetermined by the Leninist principles of military development, the social makeup and purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are standing on guard over the achievements of people's power.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 6, 1984

CSO: 1812/24

PARTY-POLITICAL WORK DURING EXERCISES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 84 pp 22-23

[Article by Colonel B. Yamshanov]

[Text]

READY FOR ACTION

The battalion command realised that the men had to be attuned morally, politically and psychologically in preparation for the exercise. They should know their missions, the service regulations requirements and orders of the superiors.

The battalion commanding officer, his deputy for political affairs and secretaries of the Party and YCL bureaux met for a brief meeting. The commander informed them of the intention of the exercise, its specific features, the time it would take and its main stages. Proceeding from his information they jointly formulated the tasks of Party-political work, drew up a plan and decided what they should do to make the most of the Party and YCL activists.

Captain A. Mekhovich and Captain N. Kazakov, secretary of the battalion Party bureau, conducted a seminar with the deputy company commanders for political affairs and secretaries of company Party and YCL organisations. At the seminar they discussed the content, forms and methods of Party and YCL work during the preparations for the exercise, when the assembly signal was sounded, on the march, in the assembly area and in the course of the attack. The participants in the seminar were given concrete recommendations with account of the missions of each sub-unit.

Attention was focussed on work with the men directly in the companies. Having instructed the YCL group organisers, platoon propagandists and combat bulletin editors, the deputy company commanders for political affairs supplied them

with the necessary materials and aids. Propagandists were assigned to every infantry fighting vehicle crew from among the better educated privates.

Captain A. Novikov, battalion chief of staff, instructed the men on the methods of attack to be employed by the motorised infantry battalion. Senior Lieutenant Y. Sadykov, deputy company commander for political affairs, briefed the activists on Party-political work in the dynamics of action.

In pursuit of their Party assignments the Communists conducted talks with the men on the purposes of the forthcoming exercise and security measures. There were separate talks with the non-commissioned officers and driver-mechanics of the infantry fighting vehicles.

The Party activists made no small contribution to preparation of the weapons and other combat equipment for the exercise. They kept the secretary of the Party bureau informed about the course of work. If there were difficulties, these were dealt with immediately.

The day before the battalion proceeded to the field the companies held open Party and YCL meetings. In discussing the reports the Communists and YCL members made concrete proposals on effective preparations for the exercise. They urged their comrades to set a personal example to non-Party soldiers.

An emulation movement was launched between the men, sections, platoons and companies for efficient assembly when the signal was sounded, and for effective execution of the march and accomplishment of missions during action. Special attention was drawn to meeting proficiency standards.

ATTUNED TO VICTORY

The assembly signal was sounded unexpectedly. However, the duty officer and sergeants issued pertinent clear-cut orders. In a matter of minutes the men were already in the fighting vehicle park. In a second the engines were roaring. The fighting vehicles drew out in strict order.

On the march the political workers and activists set an example to the others. The march was executed in an organised fashion and right on schedule. At halts the specialists checked the technical condition of the vehicles. While they were doing their job, the editors put out combat bulletins giving publicity to those who showed good performance during the march. The section leaders and platoon commanders briefly summed up the results of the first stage of the march. A lightning leaflet was circulated among the infantry fighting vehicles. It was devoted to the men of Senior Lieutenant M. Strelnikov. As the combat security subunit they acted promptly on the commanding officer's narratives.

The battalion finally reached the assembly area. The commanders and political workers ensured quick and concealed positioning of the subunits. Everything was being done to simulate actual combat conditions as closely as possible. The men carried out the engineering works, and the infantry fighting vehicles were concealed and camouflaged. They checked the weapons and other combat equipment. A duty detail was assigned.

In the companies mobile Lenin rooms were set up. This enabled the men to hear the latest news broadcasts, acquaint themselves with visual propaganda aids and read the combat bulletins. The deputy company commanders for political affairs distributed the latest editions of the newspapers that had been delivered. The propagandists conducted talks on the history of the unit, its combat record. It had been awarded orders for victories over the nazis during the Great Patriotic War. One of the companies held a YCL meeting. Private V. Malakhin, a young soldier, was admitted to the Young Communist League. He was commended for his achievements in combat training.

Then the final stage of the exercise came. An air alert was sounded. The roar of aircraft engines filled the air. Soon bombs were exploding and the antiaircraft artillery opened fire. The action was very similar to actual combat. In the "battle" the Communists and YCL members set a personal example to the other men by exemplary performance of their duty.

When the "enemy" counterattacked the sub-

nits consolidated their positions. The men were kept abreast of the tactical situation by the propagandists. They were also briefed on the situation of their neighbours. They all knew their missions. Having beaten off the counterattack, the battalion swiftly went over into the attack and soon captured an "enemy" strong point.

EXPERIENCE, A COMMON ASSET

When the exercise was over, the political workers, Party and YCL activists had even more work to accomplish. Now their job was to analyse all the stages of the field exercise, appraise the men's performance, summarise the advanced experience and establish the causes of errors.

At an officers' meeting the officer in charge of the tactical exercise conducted a detailed critique. He appraised the performance of the company and platoon commanders, mentioning the more instructive decisions. He drew the attention of the officers to the elements of combat training which were still weak. The shortcomings had to be eliminated. In particular, he said that the success of the exercise was largely due to good preparation of combat equipment. There had not been a single breakdown. No vehicle had straggled en route or had gone out of action. However, fire training standards were not uniform. The men of Lieutenant N. Latokin's platoon showed poorer results than their neighbours. This was the officer's fault. The commanding officer demanded that the situation be rectified.

Captain A. Mekhovich analysed the Party-political work. He cited concrete examples to illustrate the educational work of the commanders, political workers, Party and YCL organisations of the subunits. He gave an appraisal of the measures carried out in field conditions.

After the general critique the battalion Party bureau discussed the results of the exercise at its meeting. The activists decided to sum up the experience in the preparation of the equipment for the exercise in Senior Lieutenant M. Strelnikov's company. The company showed a particularly good performance in the field. The deputy battalion commander for technical service, a Communist, was asked to report on the matter. Having examined the experience of the advanced company he extended it to all the subunits so that they could be as good as the best subunit.

On instructions from the Party bureau, Captain A. Novikov conducted a demonstration lesson in fire training in Lieutenant Latokin's platoon. It was also attended by the other platoon commanders. The young officers benefited from lear-

ning the methods of a more experienced comrade.

The company commanders and their deputies for political affairs conducted separate critiques for the sergeants and privates. They appraised the performance of every serviceman. The officers commended the men who distinguished themselves in action and pointed out the shortcomings of those who did not do as well as they could have done. They also evaluated the work of the Party and YCL activists, propagandists and editors of combat bulletins.

The exercise proved to be a good school both for the commanders and the men.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 8, 1984

CSO: 1801/51

WARSAW PACT

MSU KULIKOV ON ARMS RACE

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 6, Jun 84 pp 2-5

[Article by V. Kulikov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, commander-in-chief, Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member Countries: "Curb the Arms Race: An Urgent Need"]

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Georgiyevich Kulikov, Hero of the Soviet Union, began serving in the Soviet Armed Forces in 1939. During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) he was commander of a motorcycle company, chief of staff of a battalion, and chief of staff of a separate tank brigade. He fought on the South-Western, Kalinin, First Baltic and Second Byelorussian fronts. After the war he held leading posts in the Soviet Armed Forces. In 1964-1976 he was commander of an army, Commander of the forces of the Order of the Red Banner Kiev Military District, Commander-in-Chief of the Group of the Soviet Forces in Germany, and Chief of General Staff-First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR. Since 1977 Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov has been First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR--Commander-in-Chief, Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member Countries. He is a member of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In pursuing its foreign policy the USSR has invariably proceeded from the interests of a lasting peace, and freedom and independence of peoples. The Communist Party and Soviet state have been persistently conducting a course for removing the threat of nuclear war and administering a firm rebuff to the aggressive forces of imperialism. Addressing the Extraordinary February 1984 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Konstantin U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said:

"As a great socialist power, the Soviet Union is fully aware of its responsibility to the peoples for preserving and strengthening peace. We are open to peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation with states on all continents. We are for the peaceful settlement of all disputed international problems through serious, equal and constructive talks."

Thus, the CPSU Central Committee Plenary Meeting again forcefully reaffirmed that the reckless, adventurous actions of aggressive imperialist forces in the international arena shall be opposed by the clear-cut position of the Soviet state. This is a Leninist peace policy whose basic features, at the current historical stage, have been determined by the decisions of recent CPSU congresses. It is fully in keeping with the fundamental interests of the Soviet people and, in actual fact, of the other peoples of the world.

The Ninth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in December 1983 urged the U.S. Congress and the parliaments of the other NATO member countries to spare no efforts in getting their governments to abandon the policy "from positions of strength" which constitutes a danger to the cause of peace, in getting their governments to abandon the policy "from positions of strength" which constitutes a danger to the cause of peace, in getting the USA and NATO to abandon the line for achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, because this line tends to exacerbate international relations and breeds mistrust among states.

It is worth noting that last December the NATO Council held its winter session at Brussels. Its final document was the so-called Brussels Declaration, which is actually a declaration of escalating the arms race.

In this document the U.S. and NATO leaders outwardly professed a love of peace and issued calls for cooperation to place the entire responsibility for the aggravation of the international situation, for the failure of the Geneva talks on nuclear arms limitation on the Soviet Union. However, any sober-minded person can see that the Washington Administration had programmed in advance the torpedoing of these talks. This is evidenced by the decisions of the NATO Council session at Brussels. They approved the steps of the governments of Great Britain, the FRG and Italy to deploy the first few Pershing-2s and ground-based long-range cruise missiles in their countries. The session demanded that the other NATO member states should implicitly carry out the council's decisions on this question and should ensure the realisation of the long-term military programme for the period ending in 1995. The Brussels session also formalised the demand to all the NATO member countries to continue, as in the past, to conduct a policy "from positions of strength" and direct confrontation with the USSR and the other member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

At Brussels the NATO member countries discussed in detail the problem of achieving superiority over the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in conventional armaments. They proposed to solve this problem by equipping their forces with conventional arms systems of a new generation, above all with highly accurate long range weaponry, modern air defence means and devices for electronic countermeasures, and also by highly promising troop control and communication systems.

These decisions in principle are not new. NATO's long-term rearmament programme adopted in 1978 provided for the achievement of military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty Organisation by the mid-1990s. And now it is intended to accomplish this task in a shorter time.

NATO is extremely eager to secure superiority in all types of equipment and weaponry. This is why NATO's Defence Planning Committee has endorsed a four-year plan for raising the combat capability of the armed forces of the European member countries. This is to be accomplished through the earlier fulfillment of the measures provided for in the long-term programme. In June 1983 the committee approved a plan for the development of the NATO armed forces for 1985-1990. In pursuit of these plans NATO has been building up both nuclear and conventional arms. For instance, the forces have been outfitted with new models of weapons and other military equipment. In addition, the weapons systems that have been retained have been modernised. In the view of foreign military specialists, the overall capabilities of the land forces and tactical air force stationed in the European theatre of operations have increased 25 percent.

During the same period the land forces have received tanks of the latest models, artillery, antitank and air defence means. The leaders of the NATO armed forces maintain that this has boosted the fire and striking power of the land units and formations. The overall number of tanks in the NATO forces in the European theatre has shown a marked increase during the current five-year period, making up a total of 17,000 units. In addition, in the depots in Europe there are about 1,500 U.S. and 6,500 West European tanks. It should be mentioned that a large number of these tanks are new machines with better combat characteristics, such as the U.S. M-1 Abrams, West German Leopard-2s and British Challengers. Their combat capabilities exceed those of earlier models by between 50 and 100 percent.

NATO has also boosted the capabilities of its field artillery. This has been secured through increases in quantities of artillery pieces, renewal and modernisation of ordnance, introduction of qualitatively new ammunition, including ammunition of greater destructive power. Since 1980 the U.S. land forces have been receiving multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). It is believed that the fire power of a MLRS installation is equal to that of three or four 155-mm howitzer batteries.

NATO intends further to increase the fire power of its land forces through the introduction of Assault Breaker reconnaissance strike complexes which are capable of spotting and destroying tank subunits at a range of up to 200 kilometres. There is also a PLSS system which is designed to locate and destroy enemy objectives outfitted with radar and communication means.

While NATO has been re-outfitting its land forces with new, advanced weaponry and other military equipment which are being delivered in growing quantities, it has also been increasing the number of its units and formations and improving their organisational structure. Thus, the number of armoured (tank) divisions in Europe has been boosted from 19 to 22. The trend towards further growth is still manifest. The structure of a new, so-called Division-86 has been developed. It is believed that the new division will be characterised by greater offensive striking power and fire power. It will be outfitted with highly effective antitank and air defence means. It is maintained that such a division will be able to operate effectively in the face of employment of mass destruction weapons and means of electronic countermeasures.

In planning its aggressive actions NATO's military leadership has been paying serious attention to the tactical air arm. In pursuit of the long-term programme for improving the capabilities of the tactical air force, NATO re-equipped it in 1979-83 with new aircraft and outfitted the aircraft with advanced weapons and ammunition of greater destructive power. Over the past five years the tactical air force received new A-10, F-15, F-16, Alpha-jet and Tornado aircraft. Foreign experts believe that the quantitative and qualitative changes made in the tactical air force in Europe have considerably increased the combat capabilities of NATO's combined air force. Today NATO has some 3,500 tactical aircraft in service in Europe. It is further increasing the numerical strength of its tactical air force. In 1984 NATO plans to add another 300-odd latest aircraft and large number of combatant helicopters which are to be delivered by European countries alone.

The prevailing trend in the development of NATO's naval forces consists in raising their combat capabilities through the commissioning of new and modernisation of existing ships and aircraft of the naval air arm, and also through the introduction of new weapons systems. The regular navies of the NATO member countries now have close to 1,300 war ships. They are receiving new ships. Thus, every year the USA adds 20 modern ships to its navy.

Qualitative improvement of weapons, military equipment and the organisational structure of the units and formations making up NATO's armed forces is accompanied by research in optimal methods of employing their increased combat capabilities. This is reflected in new concepts and in the revision of service regulations and manuals. The NATO staffs are working on plans for war in Europe with the help of conventional weapons only. In December 1982 NATO's Defence Planning Committee approved a plan of this kind. It is maintained that it was produced by American General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Its essence consists in building up a superiority over the Warsaw Treaty member countries in conventional arms, and in ensuring favourable conditions for military operations to rout the opposing armed forces in the early period of a war without employment of nuclear weapons. NATO's military leaders believe that in the very beginning of a war it would be possible to put out of action with fire means the forces of the Warsaw Treaty member countries throughout the entire operational depth. It follows that, in their opinion, it would also be possible to shatter the rear echelons and the reserves before they are committed to action.

However, this does not mean that, in this connection, NATO has abandoned the idea of using nuclear weapons. Regardless of the war models the NATO strategists may have devised, their plan is to be the first to use the nuclear weapon. Addressing the influential Carnegie Fund in Washington last December, the very same General Rogers reaffirmed the principle of the first use of nuclear weapons, because, this, so he said, was a key principle underlying NATO's military doctrine, irregardless of the accomplishment of programmes for increasing the combat capabilities of conventional arms.

Irrespective of the weapons it may use to start a war--whether nuclear or conventional arms, NATO plans to conduct hostilities on the territories of the Warsaw Treaty member countries. This exposes the aggressive, offensive,

character of the U.S. and NATO strategic doctrines, including the concept of the recent air-land battle. Its fundamentals have been laid down in the U.S. Army's new Field Manual FM 100-5, section on conduct of hostilities.

This concept reflects the qualitatively new views of the U.S. Command on the content and character of future combat operations with due account of the re-outfitting of the U.S. armed forces with the latest weaponry and other materiel in the 1980s.

Western experts characterise the air-land battle as a method of employing ground and air force formations in close cooperation with one another. The operation is to achieve the aims set through fire strikes at enemy dispositions and groupings to a depth of 300 kilometres, through manoeuvres and a series of interconnected battles. It is believed that such operations will be most typical of the initial period of war in European theatres of operations, in which deeply echeloned armoured and mechanised forces have already been deployed.

A new offensive concept naturally calls for new materiel, NATO is now engaged in creating this new materiel within the shortest possible time. U.S. strategists maintain that the tactical air force will not be the only arm capable of delivering attacks on the enemy throughout his operational depth. They say that the ground troops should also have such capabilities. To this end they should be outfitted with new highly accurate conventional weapons systems, such as the Assault Breakers, multiple launch rocket systems, and also multiple warhead cruise missiles. Insofar as the destructive power of these new conventional arms is concerned, it is close to that of tactical nuclear weapons.

It follows that the Rogers Plan and the air-land battle are elements of a single strategy of direct contention with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. It provides for reckless use of armed force as the main means of struggle for the establishment of U.S. world domination. This is precisely why the USA and NATO are engaged in a skyrocketing buildup not only of nuclear weapons but of conventional armaments as well. This poses a real threat to peace. It should be pointed out that regardless of the type of weapons used to unleash another world war, it is bound to end in an inevitable nuclear holocaust. Therefore, the reckless gamble which the USA and NATO have started is not merely irresponsible, but perilous, too.

The military-political leaders of the USA and NATO should realise that no matter what weapons they may develop, no matter what methods of unleashing aggressive wars and warfare they may devise, the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty will honourably and competently meet any challenge. The Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenary Meeting pointed out that "we will not let the military equilibrium that has been achieved be upset." The USSR and its allies have everything they need to meet the challenge.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 6, 1984

CSO: 1812/24

ARMED FORCES

LT GEN VOLKOGONOV ON U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 6, Jun 84 pp 55-56

[Article by Lt Gen D. Volkogonov, Doctor of Science (Philosophy), professor:
"The Logic of Retaliatory Measures"]

[Text] The American Pershings and Tomahawks continue to arrive in Western Europe. The first nine Pershings stationed in Mutlangen (FRG) and sixteen Tomahawks positioned in Greenham Common (Great Britain) have been placed on the alert and targeted at the Soviet Union. As U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated in Paris on December 2, 1983, the remaining missiles, out of 572 scheduled for deployment in Europe will arrive there right on schedule.

What does the deployment of these new American missiles mean from a strategic viewpoint? Even today the U.S. strategic forces (both land-, sea- and ground-based) can deliver to the targets over 12,000 nuclear warheads in the first strike (sortie) and if tactical means and nuclear forces of other NATO countries are taken into account, many times more. How will the Soviet Union and its allies react to this new and extremely dangerous challenge?

Pentagon's Nuclear Hostages

The Pentagon is incessantly searching out ways for achieving a "decisive victory" in a nuclear war. The Five-Year Defence Guidance 1984-1988 signed by the U.S. President proclaims the need to be ready to destroy socialism as a socio-political system. This general doctrine of Washington prompted the Pentagon to explore every possibility to gain the upper hand in the "decisive conflict" with the Soviet Union. An important part in achieving this unattainable goal is allocated to Western Europe.

The decision to deploy almost 600 new American missiles was made back in December 1979, four years before the beginning of the scheduled deployment. This is not fortuitous. During these years Washington has been trying to disarm the Soviet Union at the negotiating table by putting forward absolutely unacceptable proposals. Besides, at that time the Pershing-2 missile had not yet been ready for deployment: its last test launch took place in September 1983, after which it was put into production. At the same time Washington's strategic goal in respect to Western Europe had been absolutely clear from the very outset, though NATO politicians go out of their way to disguise it under the cover of a propaganda campaign.

The principal aim of the Washington strategists is to use these missiles to divert a maximum possible amount of Soviet nuclear weapons from the United States and thus to avoid a forced retaliatory strike by the Soviet Union. They on the Potomac understand that in response to a nuclear attack against the USSR, the Soviet Union will, naturally, deliver a retaliatory strike and therefore they would like to confine the conflict to Europe. According to their designs this would constitute the ideal war since the principal military operations of such a war would be carried out outside the territory of the United States.

There is another aspect of the Pentagon's plans which makes hostages of its European allies. Located near the boundaries of the Soviet Union and its allies, these missiles are planned to be used in a so-called disarming strike. According to the Pentagon's "direct confrontation" doctrine, the purpose of such a strike is to destroy the nuclear-missile potential of the enemy who could have used it to deal a retaliatory blow. In Caspar Weinberger's quarters this disarming blow is cynically called a "beheading" blow. The Pentagon's strategists make no secret of the fact that the primary purpose of this blow is to destroy or put out of action state and military decision centres and Soviet nuclear-missile systems.

It should be also borne in mind that all the new American missiles scheduled for deployment in Europe are, as far as the USSR is concerned, strategic weapons, while the Soviet SS-20 missiles, being tactical weapons, pose no danger to the United States because of their limited range. In contrast to this, U.S. Pershing and Tomahawk cruise missiles, if deployed in Europe, can reach any point in the European part of the USSR. That is why the Big Lie, so widely used in the West, about the "unprecedented Soviet threat" the Soviet medium-range missiles allegedly pose is meant for misinformed listeners, readers and onlookers. D. Donovan, American sociologist, openly affirms that the Soviet threat is the most convenient and constant enemy. If no such threat had existed, the military would simply have invented it.

Using the most crafty methods of psychological warfare, the U.S. "hawks" have been incessantly trying to instill in the readers' and listeners' minds the idea that the Soviet threat is not mythical but real. They are playing a deliberate game aimed at making uninformed people admit that no equal security exists between the states of the two opposite social systems. In fact they need this anti-Soviet propaganda campaign to justify the right of the United States and NATO to deliver a "first," "disarming," or "beheading" strike.

With the arrival of the American missiles a shadow of nuclear danger has fallen upon Europe. But the honest people do not agree with the role the transatlantic strategists have prepared for them to play. Millions upon millions of people in Western countries have begun to understand increasingly clearly that life in a nuclear twilight portends only evil. Their attitude towards the "Euromissiles" is vividly demonstrated by the antimilitarist movement that has acquired unprecedented dimensions.

In August 1983, 56 percent of West Germans voiced their opposition to the deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe. In December of the same year

(when the deployment began) the number against reached 76 percent. Nearly half the British and 62 percent of Italians also oppose the deployment of new American missiles.

At their sessions held in the first decade of last December in Brussels various NATC committees worked out additional measures aimed at "neutralising" the antimissile movement in Europe. According to these decisions and instructions from Washington, concrete steps have already been taken to discredit the leaders of the peace movement and to plant provocateurs and agents of special services in the protesters' ranks. The command from the other side of the ocean, which first resounded in Brussels, have found response in other NATO countries' capitals as well. In Bonn, for instance, a special coordination centre has been set up to "block the antisocial elements protesting under peace slogans."

Thus, we see that the reckless steps taken by the United States and NATO have made the world even more unstable and have sparked an unprecedented wave of social protest.

Balance of Forces as a Guarantee of Security

In the face of the mounting military threat, mankind is arriving at the indisputable truth that its hopes for the future can be realised only under peaceful conditions. But the shadow of a nuclear threat originated by the United States and NATO is becoming thicker with every day.

The Soviet leadership stated on more than one occasion that nowadays peace can be ensured only on the basis of adhering to the principle of equal security for all states. The attempts on the part of the United States to ensure its own security at the expense of the total insecurity of the USSR and its allies heightens the risk of war. In the existing military-political situation, only a balance of the nuclear-missile forces of the two opposing alliances can ensure peace on earth.

In the present interdependent and interrelated world any attempt to tip this balance can result in an irretrievable catastrophe. Unfortunately, Washington has been unable to recognise this fact. Thus, the military-strategic parity serves as a factor on whose base it would be possible to proceed to the next stage--to talks on the balanced, equal and gradual reduction of the arms levels of the two countries. But the whole content of U.S. policy and Washington's concrete steps are directed at upsetting, destroying and sharply tipping the existing balance of strategic forces between the USSR and the United States. This is the equivalent of destroying the foundation on which the building of peace rests: it may not only rock but even tip over altogether, burying under its debris millions of people, including, by the way, the instigators of these appalling actions.

Being true to its principled policy of preserving peace, the Soviet Union has no option but to meet this dangerous challenge. The purpose of the measures it has taken is to preserve the balance in the nuclear missile potentials between the USSR and the United States. In the Statement by Yu. V. Andropov

it is underlined that the concrete measures taken by the Soviet side are aimed at preventing the United States and NATO from upsetting the military equilibrium. The nationwide support of these measures testifies that the Soviet people are fully resolved to construct reliable barriers in the way of the NATO war chariot. What are these measures?

Previously the Soviet Union in an effort to create a favourable atmosphere at the Geneva talks on medium-range weapons unilaterally declared a moratorium on the deployment of these weapons in the European part of the USSR. Now this moratorium is abrogated. Besides, on agreement with the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia the preparatory work to deploy on the territory of these countries operational-tactical missiles will be accelerated. The Soviet missiles possess a range sufficient to reach the areas where new American missiles will be deployed.

What's most important, and this should be underlined, is that the Soviet Union cannot put aside the level of threat to the United States itself, on which the Pentagon has staked by placing its missiles in Europe. This threat will be entirely adequate to that posed by the "Euromissiles" on the USSR and its allies. In compliance with the Statement by Yu. V. Andropov, corresponding sea-based nuclear-missile systems will be deployed in ocean areas and seas adjoining the territory of the United States to the same degree which the direct threat to the USSR has increased. In their range, power and accuracy and what is especially important, in their flight time to the target they will be adequate to the American missiles in Europe.

Of course, some other countermeasures will be taken, if necessary. But all these measures are forced. Their purpose is to preserve the military equilibrium.

Regrettably, in Washington foreign policy continues to be regarded as something in which there must be a winner and loser. But such attitude is justified in relation to, for instance, poker. It is high time for those in Washington to realise that such policy can lead only to a loss for all--to war, while the people need peace. Only a balance, or parity of nuclear forces can guarantee peace on earth.

The Soviet Union was forced to meet the militarist challenge imposed on it. We know well that though the potential aggressor is unable to win a nuclear war, he is able to unleash it. The Soviet people realise that the greater the military might of the Soviet Union and the better the combat readiness of its Armed Forces, the lower is the probability that the aggressor will dare to unleash a nuclear adventure. Such is the logic of Soviet Union's retaliatory measures.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 6, 1984

CSO: 1812/24

ARMED FORCES

DEP MIN EDUCATION SHTYKALO ON NEW SCHOOL REFORMS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 14, Jul 84 pp 21-25

[Article by F. Shtykalo, deputy USSR minister of education: "The School's New Frontiers"]

[Text] A national conference on education was held in our nation this year. It discussed the draft school reform worked out by the party Central Committee. Many millions of Soviet citizens took part in the lively and concerned discussion of the draft and enriched it with their collective intelligence and experience in life. The April 1984 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 1st Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, approved the "Main Directions for Reform of the General Education and the Vocational School." This document contains a program for improving the public education and indoctrination of our young replacements based on a solid foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory, on the achievements of the developed socialist society and on the Leninist principles for organizing the Soviet school.

The reform reflects the basic interests of both each Soviet person and our entire society. Its aim is to indoctrinate the youth and prepare them for life and labor more effectively. In our order for our society to move confidently ahead toward the great goals, after all, each new generation must rise to a higher level of education and occupational skills, of general culture and civil activeness.

Stressing the importance of steps taken in connection with the school reform, Comrade K.Yu. Chernenko made the following statement in his speech at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations: "They are expected to help each young individual prepare himself better for his independent working life, to create the capital, figuratively speaking, which will give him a high rate of interest over the long years."

The reform's main directions rely on the extensive experience and the achievements of Soviet education, while at the same time taking into account the growing social needs and the requirements of scientific and technical progress. The reform principles essentially embody Lenin's idea of uniting training with productive labor. The training and indoctrinational work are linked more thoroughly with production. Among other things, the reform calls for increasing the amount of training time for labor lessons and additionally establishes

mandatory, publicly useful work for students from the 2nd to the 11th grade. Vocational education is now organically linked with general secondary education for the youth. More than 2,000 hours will be allocated for job training and publicly useful work. This is more than double the amount of time presently allocated.

It is planned to intensify the vocational orientation of all training courses, particularly the job training, to introduce a special course on "Fundamentals of Production: Selecting a Profession," and to set up well-equipped job orientation offices not only in the secondary schools, but also in the 9-year schools, at many extramural establishments, in production training combines and at base enterprises, during the period 1986-1990. The work of the special interdepartmental commissions for job orientation is being stepped up, and state job orientations centers with specialists such as sociologists, psychologists, doctors and other workers are being set up on an experimental basis at a number of places.

It is felt that the bringing together of the school and production will have a most favorable effect upon the preparation of the youth to serve in the army and navy, because education, indoctrination and labor in union form strong communist convictions and develop the young individual morally and physically.

The reform calls for the allocation of more time for job training for the students to be organically combined with a further improvement in the level of general education. The reform orients us toward a more profound world outlook focus in the teaching of the various disciplines. It calls for the optimal ratio of natural sciences and the humanities for the all-round spiritual development of the school children. The orientation toward the thorough study of specific subjects also calls for a thorough mastery of all the disciplines.

There can be no question that the quality of preparation of the officer cadres will have to be affected by all of this. We know, after all, that the secondary school graduates sometimes demonstrate an inadequate knowledge of the exact sciences--mathematics, for example--on the entrance exams for military educational institutions. And the importance of this science is constantly growing, particularly as a result of the use of electronic computers in military affairs. Consequently, the foundation of knowledge layed at the school is becoming increasingly important in the subsequent development of the cadet and the officer.

The reform also calls for the thorough study of the Russian language, which has been voluntarily accepted by the Soviet people as the means of international communication, along with the native language. It is very important for every secondary school graduate to be fluent in the Russian language. This is especially essential for young draftees of non-Russian nationality, since it means that the commanders and political workers have to spend far less time and effort making up the school's failings and teaching certain draftees the Russian language.

The teacher is unquestionably the main figure in the implementation of the school reform. He has great influence today. At the same time, his responsibility to society for the training and indoctrination of the students is growing by the year. Advanced training acquired through courses is no longer

adequate for the teacher to improve the quality of the training and indoctrinational process. He must study constantly and persistently. The modern teacher must always be at the peak of knowledge in that science the basics of which he is teaching the children, and must correctly understand and take into account all developments and processes of public life in his work. He must perfect his teaching skills on a daily basis and measure it against the knowledge and abilities of his students, against their actions and their attitude toward reality and toward publicly useful activities. The teacher sets an example for emulation and is a model in the observance of our moral standards.

In short, the improvement of teacher training is one of the main directions of the school reform. The training plans and programs of educational institutions for teachers will be revised with a view to intensifying the psychological and pedagogical preparation of the young specialists, improving the organization of continuous teaching practice, expanding the teaching of ethics, aesthetics and methods of indoctrinational work, and studying modern production and job orientation methods. In the process of creating the proper conditions, the teachers' VUZ's will be converted to a 5-year period of study for a number of specialities.

It is also planned to increase the number of teachers being trained, to improve the functioning of methodological service facilities and to introduce the department system at advanced teacher training institutes. Ways have been outlined for improving teacher certification and stimulating the teachers' work. Among other things, the titles "Indoctrinator and Methods Expert," "Senior Pioneer Leader and Methods Expert" and others are being established. It is planned to award teachers the Order of Labor Glory for success in the training and indoctrination of the school children. The CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU have adopted a decision to increase the wages of teachers and other public education workers.

The altering of the school structure is one of the most important new things covered by the reform. The period of study is being increased by 1 year--from 10 to 11 years--and the training will begin at the age of 6 years. This is an extremely complex matter. It is essential in each specific case to set up the system for the classes, rest and games for the 6-year-old children, and only then to begin their training. In other cases school teachers can be used for teaching the 6-year-olds in kindergartens. Simultaneously, over a period of several years, 7-year-old children will also begin studying in the school.

The altering of the school's structure organically entails the adoption of new study plans and programs. This, in turn, means that current textbooks must be improved and new ones written for all the grades.

The assigning of a base enterprise to each school and each training combine gives a new quality to the school-production alliance. The enterprises are now active and responsible organizers of the labor and vocational development of the students. Interrelations between the school and production will be governed by a special statute, which is presently being worked out. In the working collectives the youth will be taught organization, true collectivism, discipline, an aware and conscientious attitude toward labor.

Implementation of the many things called for under the reform is naturally an important matter for the Lenin Komsomol. More than 70 percent of the school children in the age group affected are Komsomol members. The party has entrusted the Komsomol with leading the Pioneers. It will be necessary to review and revitalize the forms and methods of Komsomol work in the school. In order to enhance the role of Komsomol organizations in the development of student self-government and initiative it will be necessary to shift the hub of their work to the classroom, to the Komsomol group. The effective indoctrination of Pioneers and school children will be assured by the rich content and vivid forms of work, by the romantic enthusiasm surrounding the activities, and by the ability of the Komsomol members to attract the children with their example and their commendable deeds.

The successful accomplishment of the diverse tasks involved in improving public education will depend in great part upon interaction between the family and the school. It is important for the parents to make proper use of the family's growing material and cultural possibilities for developing spiritual aspirations, modesty, reasonable demands and industriousness in the children. Parental love absolutely must be combined with strictness on the part of the parents and civil responsibility to society for their children. It is the task of the school and the teaching staffs to use every possible means to counteract those families which create a climate of consumption mentality in the homelife, pettily protect their children from cares and household duties, and indulge their whims.

Cultural establishments and creative unions are expected to make an invaluable contribution to the reformation of the school. We can state unequivocally that we have accumulated some good experience in this matter. The school's need for help from cultural workers is growing, however. This involves not just meetings between writers, artists, composers, stage and screen figures and the school children, but also their direct participation in the aesthetic upbringing of Soviet children.

Particular importance is attached to indoctrinating the school children in the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of our party and our people in the accomplishment of the extensive tasks involved in the school reform.

Military-patriotic indoctrination of the school children is performed both in the course of their studies and during the extracurricular and extramural work performed with them. These processes are united by the commonality of the basic goals of communist indoctrination. Comrade K.Yu. Chernenko made the following statement in his speech to the electors of Moscow's Kuybyshev Electoral District: "We constantly concern ourselves with preparing the kind of youth who will not flinch from and not stoop beneath the load of historical responsibility for the nation's fate, for the fate of socialism and peace, youth who will be able not only to assimilate the experience of the older generations but also to enrich it with their own accomplishments."

We have a high range of forms and methods of military-patriotic indoctrination. It provides the school teachers, DOSAAF organizations, commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists of the military units and ships, war and

labor veterans with possibilities for indoctrinating the students in the glorious traditions of the older generations purposefully, effectively and in a focused manner. The teachers' main attention in this work is focused on teaching the school children about V.I. Lenin's life and work, both during classes and outside the class, about his behests to the youth, about the unforgettable pages of history of the Great October Socialist Revolution, about the heroic feats performed by Soviet fightingmen in the Great Patriotic War and about the glorious chronicle of communist creativity.

The initial military training course has a special role with respect to familiarizing the students with the people's combat traditions. In most of the schools it is performed by experienced military instructors from among the reserve officers. Many of them are war veterans. They have gone through the harsh school of trial and served dozens of years in the army, and they have a solid body of military knowledge and experience in combat and in life. As a rule, these are skillful teachers who love their work. They pass on their extensive military knowledge to the students and instill in the school children a love for the Soviet Armed Forces and a constant readiness to defend the socialist homeland. The Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Education has indicated its approval of the informative experience of V. Bondarenko, secondary school military instructor in the city of Kaliningrad, and A. Popov, secondary school military instructor in the city of Tambov. They have carried out the initial military training for many years and enjoy great respect from their fellow teachers. Both veterans have been awarded the badges "Outstanding Educator of the USSR" for their success in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the children.

In most of the schools the initial military training is being improved by the year, and the quality of the classes is rising. Documents on the reform, however, state that we must resolutely improve the military-patriotic indoctrination of the students and their preparation to serve in the army and navy, and devote special attention to the development of applied military abilities and skills in the students and the shaping of the qualities of a defender of socialism's conquests and of a patriot and internationalist in them.

Far from all of the possibilities have been used in this work. They include improving the lessons and extracurricular activities, intensifying their linkage with the physical training, and better selection and retraining of military instructors from among the reserve officers at assemblies in the military units and in courses at advanced training institutes for teachers. Military sponsorship of schools and meetings between the students and the personnel of military units and cadets are not being utilized fully or extensively enough. Some of the young people have poor physical conditioning and inadequate psychological stability and lack the ability to overcome difficulties.

The physical plant for the initial military training needs a great deal of attention at all the general education and vocational schools. Not all of this by far depends upon the military instructor and the teaching staff. There is frequently a shortage of training grenades, shells and other supplies essential for studying civil defense subjects and for the medical and sanitary training, for example. I believe that the sponsorship of schools by military collectives needs to be further developed and improved. Incidentally, numerous opinions were expressed on this matter during the discussion of the reform draft.

In the indoctrinational work performed with the students inadequate attention is being given to the specific and persistent exposure of the antipopular, aggressive nature of imperialism, especially American imperialism. In certain schools not enough is being done to develop in the upper-class students a sense of political vigilance and of personal responsibility for the fate of the homeland. It is very important for the young students who are preparing themselves to enter the ranks of the army and navy to know the heroic past of our people and their Armed Forces, the lessons and results of the last war, and to remember those sacrifices which the Soviet people made at the altar of Victory. Meetings between the students and veterans of the war and the Armed Forces who are living witnesses to those awesome events, people who have added to and are still adding to the people's heroic traditions with their combat and labor feats and who are having a positive influence with respect to developing good moral qualities in the youth and increasing their knowledge, help to turn that knowledge into communist convictions.

Active preparations for the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory are under way in the nation's schools. An All-Union Review of Military-Patriotic Work is being held on the occasion of this holiday. New military-patriotic associations, future fightingman's clubs and groups for military knowledge are being formed. Upper-grade students are preparing to perform agitation and propaganda work among the population and to take part in All-Union Weeks of Revolutionary, Labor and Combat Glory. The USSR Ministry of Education and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR have begun working out a unified, comprehensive program of military-patriotic indoctrination for the students during classes and on an extracurricular basis. It is to become a mandatory document governing and directing the training and indoctrinational process for initial military training and military-patriotic work in the school.

Public education agencies and the teaching staffs of the schools are going to have to work long, purposefully and painstakingly. And that work will be accomplished, since the entire process of renewing the Soviet school is being carried out under the constant supervision of party committees and organizations. "In order for the Soviet society to advance confidently toward our great objectives," Comrade K.Yu. Chernenko stressed at the April 1984 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "each new generation must rise to a higher level of education and general culture, professional skill and civil activeness. This is the law of social progress, so to speak."

The Lenin party's constant concern for the school is convincing proof of the Soviet society's orientation toward the future.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil", 1984.

1499

CSO: 1801/3

ARMED FORCES

NEED FOR HIGHLY-QUALIFIED, WELL-ROUNDED OFFICERS STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Sep 84 p 1

[Lead editorial: "An Officer's Class Qualification"]

[Text] The soldier's class qualification is an important factor in improving combat readiness. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, CPSU Politburo member and USSR minister of defense, noted in his report at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations that the struggle for high class qualification levels is a struggle for high combat readiness.

The experience of leading units and ships indicates that high level class specialists more effectively exploit the military capabilities of weapons and equipment. Both their technical and tactical mental outlook are broader. The special importance of class qualification for officers is due to the important role which they play in the training and education of personnel and in the organization and conduct of battle. The returns from lessons, training and exercises will be greatest if the officers themselves, as the organizers, have thorough military-technical knowledge and know the most advanced techniques for the operation of weapons and equipment.

Class qualification is an indicator of the officer's attitude toward fulfilling his professional duty. It significantly affects his authority.

In many units and ships a well thought-out system has been developed for increasing the class qualifications of officers. For example, the guards fighter aviation regiment commanded by Guards Lt Col Yu. Temnikov, which is the initiator of socialist competition in the Air Force, has acquired much of value in this area. Here planned commanders' training is organically linked with officers' independent study. Skilled analyses of non-standard situations arising during flights, technical conferences, seminars, competitions and exchanges of experience are being actively introduced into the training process. Each officer has a plan for raising his class qualification level. Good conditions have been created in the unit to completely fulfill the pilot training program, which enables the aerial fighting men to pass their annual tests for confirming and raising class qualification categories.

Commanders and political officers constantly monitor the growth of officers' skills. Party and komsomol organizations make their contributions in this endeavor. Unit communists introduced an initiative, which was supported by all

unit pilots, to develop a high class category aerial fighting man on each combat aircraft.

Without high-level military-technical and specialized training it is not possible to achieve victory over an enemy equipped with modern weapons and equipment. Persistently explaining this situation, unit and ship commanders, political officers and party and komsomol activists encourage officers to exert creative initiative in training, and take care to see that they can apply the skills which they have acquired. In the tank regiment commanded by Lt Col N. Zaykin, competent leaders are always drawn into the conduct of lessons with officers. Students' knowledge and skills are verified at the tank training area and in tactical, specialized and firing training exercises, which take place day and night in an environment as close as possible to combat. Great attention is devoted to graduates of military schools. Under the supervision of masters (who have significantly increased in number in the regiment this year), as a rule the lieutenants have reached the 1st Class qualification category by the end of their second year of service, and themselves are already assisting co-workers to acquire military specialties and participating in military-technical propaganda work.

Unfortunately, it sometimes happens that some officers, having obtained high class qualification ratings in their specialty, reduce their demands upon themselves, relying on their past knowledge and experience. This situation usually develops in places where indifference and complacency exist. Relying on the high class categories of its subunit commanders, one aviation regiment lessened its control over their daily training for a time. As a result some commanders began to prepare carelessly for flights, creating the preconditions for flight accidents. Major A. Orlov, a Military Pilot 1st Class, made a hard landing. Of course this brings no honor either to him or to those required to monitor his flight training.

The level of training of highly class qualified specialists sometimes does not grow and even declines because members of external qualification commissions are indulgent to them during testing to raise or maintain their class category. In some cases they attempt to justify this by again citing the past knowledge and experience of those being tested, and other cases simply display a lack of principle. Therefore, it is very important that these commissions include competent, authoritative people. They should be carefully instructed and oriented to make objective, principled evaluations of the knowledge and skills of all those tested, without exception.

Socialist competition is a time-tested means of mobilizing officers to master military specialties. It is natural that increasing their class qualification level is always envisioned in officers' individual commitments. However, it is important not only to undertake, but also to fulfill completely these commitments. Unfortunately, not all military collectives strictly follow this requirement. Year after year the officers who are co-workers of Capt 2d Rank A. Krasnikov commit themselves to raise their class qualification, and year after year some of them fail to accomplish this commitment. This is primarily because the commander, his deputies and the party organization, once the officers have made their socialist commitments, are little interested in how they

are fulfilled, and do not publicize the results widely. Therefore, competition does not greatly stimulate officers to comradely rivalry and high indices in military training.

Owing to the tireless concern of the Communist Party and Soviet people, our Armed Forces are equipped with the most modern weapons and latest military equipment. These weapons and equipment are most effectively employed in the hands of able, highly qualified specialists, who are profoundly knowledgeable of their personal responsibility for the security of the socialist homeland. Let us mark the concluding stage of summer military training with an increase in the ranks of highly qualified class specialists and with great new achievements in the struggle for mastery of weapons and military equipment.

9069

CSO: 1801/17

ARMED FORCES

BENEFITS FOR RESERVE, RETIRED OFFICERS OUTLINED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 84 pp 85-87

[Article by Col Justice V. Vandyshev: "When the Officer Has Been Released Into the Reserve or Retirement"]

[Text] Our Advice Bureau

Our editors' mailbag includes letters from officers released from the service into the reserve or retirement, which contain requests for the magazine to print information on the benefits and privileges established for them.

We are answering their requests for information on this subject below.

Housing Benefits: Under Article 77 of the USSR Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty, officers released into the reserve or retirement are provided with housing by the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies. Furthermore, officers released into the reserve or retirement for reasons of health or age or because of personnel cuts are provided with housing by the executive committees on a priority basis, but no later than three months from the day of their arrival at a place of residence selected on the basis of existing registration procedure.

Officers called up for 2 or 3 years of military service and their families retain the housing they occupied prior to call-up for the entire period of active military service, and their names may not be removed from waiting lists for housing. After being released into the reserve those officers are provided with housing on the usual terms.

Officers who have served irreproachably at least 25 calendar years in the military and have been released into the reserve or retirement for reasons of age or health retain the right to rent housing at the special rates specified for officers on active military duty. Officers released into the reserve or retirement with the rank of colonel or its equivalent have the right to an additional room or additional living space of 10 square meters. This additional living space is rented at a single rate.

Plots of land for individual housing construction are assigned to senior officers who have served at least 25 calendar years in the military and to other officers who have served at least 25 years and been released into the reserve or retirement for reasons of health or age or because of personnel cuts. In certain cases specified by law they are provided with loans for building houses.

Job Privileges: The executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, leaders of enterprises, organizations, establishments, kolkhozes and educational institutions are required to provide officers released into reserve or retirement with work no later than a month after the request is submitted, taking their specialty into account. Officers called up from the reserve for 2 or 3 years of active military duty must be provided with a position no lower than the one they occupied prior to being called up.

The time spent by officers on active military duty in the Armed Forces of the USSR is included in their total period of work, regardless of whether they held a job prior to entering military service. The period of active military duty is also included as uninterrupted length of service for officers released into the reserve or retirement if they take a job or begin training within 3 months of the day they were released, not counting travel time to their place of residence. Under those same conditions, the military service of officers since 1 August 1983 is counted as uninterrupted length of service at the same enterprise (in the same organization), for which the social security agencies add 20 percent to the old-age pension when other established conditions have been met.

Time spent on active military duty is counted as length of service in the specialty for reserve and retired officers in accordance with current laws. For reserve officers called up for military service for 2 or 3 years, for example, their period of active military duty counts toward their length of service in the specialty if they begin working in the specialty acquired before being called up no later than 3 months after being released into the reserve (this period can be extended when there are valid reasons).

For young specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education who are inducted into the Armed Forces of the USSR, the time they spend on active military duty counts toward the period of mandatory work following graduation from an educational institution.

Blue- and white-collar workers among the officers released into the reserve or retirement, all other conditions being equal, are given preference for retaining jobs in the case of personnel cuts. This privilege is extended only for the permanent jobs which the officers first began after being released from active military duty.

For officers who were released into the reserve or retirement from military units located in regions of the Far North and equivalent areas and who took jobs in those same regions or locations within 3 months following their release, their time of uninterrupted military service (including regular service) in those regions and areas counts toward their uninterrupted length of work, which entitles them to the privileges established for regions of the Far North. Officers released from active military duty, who have concluded job contracts at enterprises and construction sites and in organizations, are given additional in accordance with current laws.

Other Benefits: Officers released into the reserve or retirement who were called up for active military duty while studying at educational institutions, retain the right to register to continue their studies at the same educational institution and at the same level at which they were studying prior to being

called up, and to receive a stipend from the day they re-enter the educational institution until the results of the next examination session are in. Officers released from active military duty for reasons of health or age or because of personnel cuts are accepted without taking the entrance exams: those with a complete or incomplete higher military education--in the first and subsequent years of study at higher educational institutions; those who have completed secondary general education schools--in the preparatory divisions at VUZ's, with a stipend; those who have completed secondary military educational institutions--in the first and subsequent years of study at secondary special educational institutions; and those with at least an 8-year education--in the first year of study at secondary special educational institutions. These officers have the right to register at secondary special educational institutions without taking the entrance exams for a period of 2 years following their release.

Officers with a secondary education who are released into the reserve are registered at higher educational institutions on a noncompetitive basis if they receive good grades on the entrance exams. They are given priority for studying part-time at VUZ's.

Officers released from military service without earning a pension, who are students at daytime higher and secondary special educational institutions or in the preparatory divisions of VUZ's, are paid a stipend if they have satisfactory grades.

Officers released into the reserve are given priority for entering vocational and technical training institutions and training courses in the corresponding occupations.

Senior officers released into the reserve or retirement for reasons of age or health after serving 25 years or more retain the right to medical aid for themselves and their families, and those who need it, to sanatorium and health resort treatment at general medical clinics, sanatoria and rest facilities of the Ministry of Defense.

Officers released into the reserve for reasons of health restrictions or personnel cuts with the rank of colonel or the equivalent, who have served 25 years or more and have reached the age of 45 years by the day of their release, are also entitled to sanatorium and health resort treatment, and medical care.

Other officers who are Great Patriotic War veterans and have been granted a pension from the Ministry of Defense upon release from the Soviet Army or Navy, have been authorized to use garrison health centers at their place of residence since 1 January 1979. Nonworking reserve and retired officers who are war veterans and were released from the military service prior to 1979 with a pension from the Ministry of Defense enjoy the same right.

Pensioned officers and members of their family are provided with all types of medical aid at civilian health establishments and at establishments of Union republic social security ministries by the same procedure and under the same terms as are pensioned blue- and white-collar workers and members of their families.

Officers who have served abroad and been released there into the reserve or retirement for reasons of health, and their wives are exempted from the taxes imposed upon bachelors, single citizens of the USSR and citizens with small families for the period of their illness, but no more than 1 year from the day of their release.

Officers disabled as a result of wounds, contusions, mutilations or illnesses received while defending the USSR or in the performance of other duties involved in the military service have the right to a disability pension. Officers also have the right to a pension for life based on length of service. Officers and their families receive pensions by the procedure and in the amounts established by the pertinent laws and decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers.

For officers who are war veterans and are receiving a pension for serving 20 or more years, who worked as blue- or white-collar workers following their release into the reserve and earned the right to an old-age pension set by social security agencies, the old age pension may be computed on the basis of rates of pay and allowances paid them prior to being released into the reserve, instead of their earnings.

Nonworking reserve and retired officers who are war veterans, as well as veterans of the Armed Forces of the USSR, who are nonworking pensioners and have served as officers irreproachably at least 25 years in the military service and been released into the reserve or retirement for reasons of age, illness, personnel cuts or health restrictions, are granted the right to become members of gardening associations (cooperatives) set up by the established procedure, regardless of their departmental affiliation. Such individuals are accepted into gardening associations (cooperatives) on the basis of recommendations submitted by the executive committees of city (or rayon) soviets of people's deputies.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil", 1984.

11499

CSO: 1801/3

ARMED FORCES

NEW REGULATIONS ON MATERIEL RESPONSIBILITY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 84 pp 85-86

[Article by Lt Col Justice Ye. Samoylov, candidate of law: "On the Materiel Responsibility of Servicemen"]

[Text] Our Advice Bureau:

The new Statute on Materiel Liability of Servicemen for Losses Caused the State was established by a 13 January 1984 ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It was designed to help increase the servicemen's sense of responsibility for protecting the weapons, equipment and other military property entrusted to them, to instill in them a thrifty regard for the people's property and to prevent thefts, losses and waste. This statute contains a number of new standards defining the basis, the types and the extent of this liability. One new thing is the fact that regular servicemen are now held materially accountable on the same basis as other categories of servicemen, whereas previously they were brought to disciplinary account for causing a materiel loss and were held criminally accountable for committing a crime.

The statute specifies that servicemen are held materially accountable by the commander only when they have caused a loss to the state in the performance of their service duties.

Servicemen are always considered to be performing their service duties when on the territory of their military unit. They can also be performing service duties when outside the unit, however--during exercises and drills, while performing their official functions or special military duties, service assignments and jobs, including temporary duty assignments, the standing of guard duty, while on patrol, and so forth. For losses caused during the performance of their service duties, they bear the same responsibility as all citizens, and in such cases court action should be brought against them for the full amount of the loss they have caused.

The existence of a direct, real loss, a causal link between an individual's actions and the subsequent loss, and the establishment of an individual's guilt in causing damage through illegal deeds are also conditions entailing mandatory materiel liability for servicemen.

A serviceman does not bear materiel liability if he has caused a loss through lawful actions or as a result of the conscientious fulfillment of his service duties or a commander's order, or when taking a service risk which is justified in the specific situation.

Under the statute the individual directly to blame for the loss is held accountable for it. A commander (or chief) may not be held materially accountable for a loss caused by his subordinate, unless it occurred as a result of improper instructions by the commander (or chief) which violate the established procedure for inventorying, storing, using, consuming and transporting military property or his failure to take the necessary steps to prevent the theft, destruction, damaging or spoilage of property or to have the guilty parties make restitution for the loss.

The statute specifies limited, total and increased materiel liability. For a loss caused by the negligent performance of service duties, servicemen bear materiel liability in the amount of the loss, but no more than the monthly rate of pay and allowance for seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, career servicemen, officers, generals and admirals; 100 rubles for regular servicemen and cadets; and 150 rubles for reservists called up for assemblies.

Commanders (or chiefs) are held accountable to the extent of their monthly rate of pay and allowances (but only in the aforementioned cases), and seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, career servicemen, officers, generals and admirals, for losses caused by them as a result of delaying railcars, vessels and motor vehicles.

Materiel liability of up to 3-months pay is specified for commanders (or chiefs) for losses in the form of payments to a blue- or white-collar worker unlawfully discharged or transferred to a job with lower pay. They are held accountable in such cases, if the individual was discharged or transferred by them in clear violation of the law or if they have delayed in carrying out the decision of a court or a superior commander (or chief) on the reinstatement of the blue- or white-collar worker at the job.

Materiel accountability in the full amount of the loss is applied only in the case of the deliberate destruction, damaging, spoilage, theft or illegal use of military property, or a loss caused by other deliberate actions, as well as the listing of jobs not actually performed and the defrauding of the state in other ways. Complete materiel liability is also borne by the guilty parties in cases of a shortage of military property placed in their charge, a loss caused by an individual in a state of intoxication, and a loss caused by an action with the characteristics of a criminally punishable act.

Increased materiel liability for servicemen is a matter of restoration of the loss in multiples of the cost of the military property. This liability is specified for causing a loss to the state through the theft, fraudulent disposal or a shortage of technical flight, special naval or airborne uniforms, special clothing or footwear, inventoried items and certain other types of military equipment. In such cases the statute specifies that the guilty parties are held materially liable in an amount ranging from 2 to 10 times the cost of the military equipment. The list of this property, which also indicates the number of times its cost is to be multiplied, is approved by the USSR minister of defense.

A decision to hold a serviceman materially liable is made only by the commander of the military unit where the guilty party is stationed and only on the basis of the findings of an administrative investigation, an audit, an inspection, an inquest, an inquiry or a court.

The loss is made up by an order issued by the commander of the military unit within a month after the investigation has been completed, by withholding the corresponding amount from the guilty party's pay and allowances. If the serviceman is held materially liable a second time, the stoppage of pay to cover the second loss is begun after the first loss is repaid.

The amount withheld each month is not to exceed 20 percent of the monthly rate of pay and allowances (50 percent in the case of a loss caused by the theft or fraudulent misapplication of military property).

The amount of indebtedness for a loss may also be exacted when the serviceman is discharged from the service. If a serviceman held materially accountable has not made up the loss he has caused by the day he is released into the reserve or retirement, the amount he still owes is exacted by an officer of the court on a compulsory basis by executive endorsement from agencies performing notarial functions.

The correct and scrupulous application of this statute assures that servicemen completely and rapidly make up losses caused the state and increases their sense of responsibility for the care and proper use of materiel.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil", 1984.

11499

CSO: 1801/3

ARMED FORCES

CONFLICT BETWEEN COMMANDER, UNIT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Major O. Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Leave Conflict"]

[Text] "Dear Editor! I serve in a remote radar company. Until recently the service has been interesting and has brought me joy. Our commander was demanding and we easily solved the most complex problems. But the situation changed drastically when Senior Lieutenant S. Aleksandrov became company commander. The first thing he did was to forbid officers and warrant officers to come to the office without being summoned....

Recently, I addressed the company commander concerning a leave which I had planned to take in March but was not able to take at that time. Here is what he told me:

"Go, turn the station upside-down, but you will take leave 'in ...ber'."

I asked again what he meant by "in ...ber". He repeated the same thing and turned away, as if to say the conversation was finished...."

These lines are from Captain G. Kesel'man's letter to the editor. In it the author also cites other facts which indicate obviously abnormal relations between him and the company commander. What is behind this conflict?

The proposal for Senior Lieutenant Serge Aleksandrov to take over the company was unexpected. He had commanded a subunit (podrazdeleniye) for a little over 2 years. He does not have quite enough experience, especially since a radar company, they say, is equivalent to a small unit (chast') with all its troublesome administration and services. Aleksandrov understood this, but agreed: they say it's not as difficult to do as it appears....

The officers and most of the warrant officers in the company turned out to be young people, well-matched for Senior Lieutenant Aleksandrov. Only Senior Lieutenant Kesel'man, the station OIC, stood out somewhat in both age and work experience. He knew his station and much other equipment perhaps better than anyone in the subunit, including the company commander.

Similar situations happen often in life and, as a rule, they pass smoothly; service is service. Here it turned out differently.

Senior Lieutenant Aleksandrov, trying to become established in his position, took roughly the following stand concerning Senior Lieutenant Kesel'man: "Although you are a little older than me and know the equipment better, I am the commander and that is why I always have the final say."

Senior Lieutenant Kesel'man's position was such: "You may be the commander but I am senior and more experienced than you. Therefore, I should have special treatment...."

Needless to say, neither one of them stated their positions aloud, and outwardly everything looked fine.

But then they happened to get into an argument over a power transformer. The transformer was old and was causing a lot of problems. One day it began smoking so badly that it became clear that it was not feasible to repair it. Senior Lieutenant Kesel'man expressed this to the commander.

"You don't want to dirty your hands?" Aleksandrov glared at him.

They tested the transformer again in Aleksandrov's presence. Everyone, and for that matter he himself, understood that it was useless to repair it. If that conclusion had come from someone else, Aleksandrov probably would have agreed with him. But he perceived Kesel'man's words as an encroachment on his authority, an attempt by a subordinate to impose his will. Therefore, he concluded: "I don't change my decisions!"

The transformer was assembled with difficulty and patched up. However, it was not used.

Shortly after that, Senior Lieutenant Aleksandrov visited Kesel'man on the job. Private A. Mikushov was seated with his collar unbuttoned and the company commander gave the station OIC a dressing down for this in the presence of subordinates.

It is not an easy process, as a rule, for an officer to assume a new position, especially if the position is related to management of people. A commander or OIC requires the ability to determine that line of conduct and select that tone of contact with subordinates which best contributes to accomplishing the tasks facing the military collective. If a commander does not have such an ability, conflict situations can arise.

That is what happened in this case. It appears, primarily, because the tone of Senior Lieutenant Aleksandrov's exactingness was not always characterized by tact, to put it mildly.

However, at times he himself also felt that here and there he was "going too far." The deputy for political affairs Senior Lieutenant V. Domashev, also took note of this:

"Sergey Alekseyevich, you should be more considerate with people."

But how did he answer? He said that he knew how he should act.

They said Aleksandrov's predecessor also was stern by nature. "That means that I must not slacken the reins either," he decided.

One day he noticed the officers and warrant officers, free from classes, discussing the results of the past day in the office. Somebody was smoking a cigarette. Without saying a word, he went to his place, frowned at those around him and said:

"Do not come in here unless you are on business!"

A reprimand for smoking in the wrong place, of course, is suggested, but why say "unless you are on business"?

It is fully understandable for the company commander to desire and strive to become established in the position, to appear as a strict and demanding superior, to subordinate the collective to a single will and to seek high results in service. It must be said that he is doing much for this. But the "explosive" manner of contact with people, the lack of proper experience and, mainly, the reluctance to heed the opinion and advice of his deputy and party activists have been a hindrance to evaluating his own work sensibly. After all, they say, one does not rush headlong into things, for you are sure to stumble.

When the question of repairing the living quarters at the "point" arose sharply, Senior Lieutenant V. Domashev, Chief Warrant Officer S. Tumanov, party organization secretary, and then Captain G. Kesel'man suggested starting with the roof of the barracks and then do minor repairs to the family housing of the officers and warrant officers. The commander decided otherwise.

Shortly after, the lathe-covered walls in the barracks lit up lusterlessly and fresh asphalt was on the walks. When the roof in the barracks started leaking again after a heavy rain, it became clear: repairs had been made with consideration mainly for those places which would catch the eyes of the inspectors. Captain Kesel'man said this bluntly at a party meeting.

Aleksandrov did not like it that Kesel'man had his own point of view on almost every question. Aleksandrov's arrogance, abruptness and lack of restraint provoked a corresponding reaction from Kesel'man, although the commander often turned precisely to him in difficult situations. So it happened this time as well when a unit broke down at the radar station by some oversight.

"I want the equipment operating by morning, like clockwork!" the company commander ordered Captain Kesel'man.

The officer worked nearly the entire night and in the morning was late for posting. The company commander called him to the office. Kesel'man reported that the trouble had been taken care of.

"That's your job," Senior Lieutenant Aleksandrov drily remarked, peering out the window. "But for being late for posting I am awarding you punishment."

Captain Kesel'man wanted to calmly answer that he had stayed up almost all night and that is why he was late. But he did not hold back. He blew up and was rude.

After that, Senior Lieutenant Aleksandrov stopped talking to Kesel'man entirely and gave all instructions to him through other officers and even through Kesel'man's wife.

Several months passed like this. At the end of the year the company commander assembled the officers and warrant officers in order to announce the leave schedule. Kesel'man's leave fell in March and he was interested in knowing why.

"Because last year your leave was in the summer, in September," he heard in reply.

"September is an autumn month," Kesel'man corrected.

"You will go when I want you to go!"

When all the dates were covered, that very conversation took place between the officers about which Captain Kesel'man wrote the editor. As it turned out, by 'in ...ber', the commander meant any month ending in these letters.

Of course, it is the commander's right to regulate leaves so that the job does not suffer. But in any case, one must not lose the sense of proportion or allow tactlessness.

Now it is hard to say whether Senior Lieutenant Aleksandrov showed less commander's wisdom and foresight or Captain Kesel'man less self-restraint and respectfulness. But the fact remains: the unhealthy attitudes of the two officers did not help improve morale in the subunit. Even the wives ended up drawn into the whirl of arguments and disagreements.

They knew about this at higher command echelon also. The unit commander and staff and political section officers persistently recommended to Senior Lieutenant Aleksandrov that he change his style of work. Six months ago communist Aleksandrov was invited to a meeting of the party commission at the unit political section. They severely pointed out the shortcomings in work to him and imposed party punishment.

However, Aleksandrov so far has not managed to eliminate the stiffness in his relations with Captain Kesel'man and find the necessary self-control. But, after all, he is still in the beginning of his officer career and it is very important to orient oneself correctly from the start as a commander.

12567

CSO: 1801/021

GROUND FORCES

NON-ADHERENCE TO TRAINING SCHEDULES CRITICIZED

Distractions Lower Training Level

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Zhitarenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Interrupted Before The End"]

[Text] People in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District considered this regiment as the right flank of competition. At the start of the training year the tankers had accepted the commitment to raise the unit to outstanding and at the end of winter training they proved that they were on the right track for they got solid, good marks in all training subjects. During the winter months I was in that unit many times and I saw that the training process was clearly organized. Regimental commander Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Klinovskiy battled decisively with weaknesses and simplifications in exercises and maintained a spirit of competition, a struggle to exceed established norms and effective use of equipment and weapons during those exercises.

The regiment also started the summer training period in an organized manner. But then the fact that there was no strictly planned beginning to the training base became noticeable. When one of the battalions was ordered to hold a demonstration tactical exercise, planned exercises were interrupted for an undetermined time and tank gunnery training was cancelled completely. All of this aroused no concern at regimental headquarters as they supposed that the subunits had already developed a reliable training base and the break in training would have no affect on gunner skills.

Another battalion was assigned missions associated with improving the material-technical training base. Of course, these tasks had to be completed without denigrating exercises and the completion of the training plan. However, the subunit put combat readiness on a secondary level.

The third battalion was very intensively working at a neighboring training center. Then, after they returned to their permanent deployment garrison, the tankers concentrated on servicing their equipment and began to split activities into compulsory and secondary. In short, they felt that they were already prepared to sum up the year.

Because I was in the division training center in June and July I saw that the extreme left portion of the moving target gunnery range was empty. This was

the area allotted to the regiment. And several people at the tank park explained that according to the plan, mechanic-drivers from our best regiment had to drive and they were therefore not at the exercise.

And then district headquarters workers conducted training evaluations in the regiment and the results were like thunder in a clear sky for the units. The subunits that were tested reflected poor training.

Inspectors stated that personnel were not even close to completing their duties. And this was at the end of the training year. Even the foremost subunits, the tank company commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Demchenko for example, could not confirm the indicators in weapons training and tank driving that they had received at the end of winter training. They had lost what they had already achieved, but this is not really surprising. Today's equipment requires regular training that is diverse in content and supports specialists' combat form. You cancel some planned tank firing training and this will turn into a loss of a point, or even "two's" in firing. Is it possible that this explains the "twos" that Guards Captains S. Gladukh, K. Goncharenko and A. Kalikov and Senior Lieutenants S. Demchenko and M. Kartsev received on the range.

How did the unit headquarters and party organization assess the results of the training evaluations? Initially they tried to justify everything with objective reasons. They said that there was rain and fog which affected the firing results and the reduced route did not allow high marks in driving. But gradually for all that they began a healthy discussion.

Is it really possible to blame the weather for the fact that many officers and sergeants did not know the new requirements for weapons training? And was it possible to expect high results from the company commanded until just recently by Guards Captain S. Savenkov since the majority of the planned firing did not take place? The regiment got so used to personnel being pulled out of training that even when the higher headquarters commission was working they were able to draw only one fifth of the platoon commanders to command training.

Serious errors were also allowed in organizing competition. During the summer months it was essentially allowed to drift. Weekly reviews were not held and there was no demand for units to fulfill their obligations. Nothing was done to stimulate training zeal. It is strange that many soldiers and sergeants were given inducements of short-term leaves to include travel to their native lands for zeal in economic work but the foremost people in training were not awarded such an honor.

An atmosphere of complacency ripened and because of that individual commanders inflated their subordinate evaluations. Guards Captain V. Panskov and Guards Senior Lieutenant Lysak are to be reproached for this. The regimental headquarters lost control. In June the company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Demchenko was declared the best in weapons training and in July this same company got "two's" in marksmanship. Having lost, if one can put it this way, the taste for combat training, the regiment stopped distinguishing between the best and the others, the skillful methodologists and those who needed help. Who was primarily to blame for this serious interruption at the end of the training year? Certainly the training process organizers. A

private taking part in competition, regardless of the enthusiasm he puts in to training and how he strives to reach the outlined goal, cannot succeed in this if the planned exercise fails and if the training plan stops being law. The regimental staff did not hold a single training evaluation in subunits during the summer period. And there were no comprehensive tests justified first through the efforts of the headquarters and the specialists of regimental services.

At the start of the training year the unit party organization through its own methods very actively struggled for discipline in the training process and for high quality exercises. The organization held communists responsible for neglect. Unfortunately, the regimental partkom [party committee] was later not consistent or firm.

After the district headquarters commission worked in the regiment, attitudes toward exercises changed. There was not a trace of the previous complacency. But it is very difficult, and this is also characteristic of our times, to make up for omissions. Only planned, rhythmic training without all-hands rush jobs and coaching can be effective. The company commanded by Guards Captain A. Gorokhov which I visited during the exercises spent twice as much time firing as the schedule allotted. The tanks and the moving target gunnery range equipment weren't ready for the exercise. During night training I saw the confused faces of Guards Junior Sergeant N. Selyutin and Guards Privates A. Kislov and N. Gerasimov. They had not fired as well as the time before for the interruption in training had deprived the tankers of their former confidence.

A great deal still has to be done in the unit so that it reaches those positions outlined at the start of the training year and unites word and deed.

Poor Firing Scores Explained

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by Major N. Khaust, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "The Battalion Gives Up Its Position"]

[Text] The motorized rifle battalion which Major Ye. Yevseyev commanded began the training year among the leaders of socialist competition. At the middle of the year, after winter training results were held, the unit had become an outsider. The motor riflemen had not managed weapons training missions. Gunner-operators, automatic riflemen, grenadiers and rocker launchers had fired poorly, especially at night. A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article published on 24 August and entitled "Is the Problem In the Electronics?" related that the subunits had tried to explain their failures by the extraordinary strictness of inspectors (they forced one BMP to "throw" a track right before firing, demanded that one of the platoons complete the exercise in gas masks and stopped the delivery of rounds with more tracers than prescribed by the weapons training course). The answer from the higher headquarters left everything, it would seem, as it was. There were hidden, true reasons for the omissions in the weapons training of the personnel and they reported what was

being done to increase the reality of training and competition and what measures were taken against the guilty people.

Four months passed and I again had occasion to visit that battalion. The second and third companies commanded by Captains I. Pravolyubov and V. Kudryavtsev had their weapons firing on a calm, windless night. First on the firing line, as it should be, were the officers, but very unfortunately, they did not set a good example for their subordinates. Captain I. Pravolyubov and Lieutenant O. Popov could not handle the exercise and Lieutenant V. Kopko received only a satisfactory evaluation.

A new group of shooters came to the firing line and again "two's". This was reminiscent of the April firing as everything was exactly the same.

And the soldiers immediately began to examine their weapons very attentively to find out the reasons for the blunders. You could hear everything. The weapon wasn't loaded and the night adapters were weak, the targets weren't completely visible. Battalion commander V. Yevseyev, skeptical about this discussion, silently took an automatic weapon from one of the failures and went to the firing line. With short bursts he hit the target, literally putting out a candle. Then on the next area where firing was also not going well for the grenadiers, he took a grenade launcher and put every round on the target.

But I did not see on Yevseyev Borisovich's face the surprise that is usual in such situations. On the contrary he grew even more gloomy.

The battalion commander in a distress manner noted, "Conditions are ideal. The people's poor training is even more obvious."

I tried to find out what would arouse personnel to work more productively.

Major V. Yevseyev noted, "Well, that is clear. According to the plan two companies are to fire today, yet Captain Kudryavtsev brought out a total of two squad commanders, one grenadier and ten mechanic-drivers to fire. I sent several mechanic-drivers to the artillery training school and the rest are on construction and economic projects."

At times you see an interesting picture. In service meetings at headquarters and at party and Komsomol meetings you hear the correct words about how combat training is the primary pursuit and that the whole life of the subunit and unit must be subordinated to its interests. And then immediately after the meeting people begin hurriedly plans for the next day's work. These changes take people away from exercises for various types of work.

And the review of winter training in the battalion in a convincing way shows where this leads. Weapons training exercises are beyond the untrained personnel's ability and they do not have enough knowledge, skills or psychological conviction.

And you could say that the summer months added nothing. Subordinates of captains I. Pravolyubov and V. Kudryavtsev received unsatisfactory marks. The day before, I was at the first company's firing and they also got "two's".

In August workers from the senior staff conducted training evaluations which included weapons training. The motor riflemen could not manage the exercise. Before this at tactical training with field firing they received a satisfactory grade for tactics and an unsatisfactory for firing. In short, the answer to the editor stating that everything would be done during the summer training period to improve the situation was an empty assertion.

The battalion definitely needs help. We must not load the people up with economic projects to the point where they cannot master their own weapons. In Captain V. Kudryavtsev's company for example not a single fire training exercise has been held in the four preceding months. True, the combat training log offered by Captain O. Tsyganok mentioned that the company had gone out to train at the artillery training school and at the tank moving target firing range eight times. This number of exercises is clearly not enough and it, as the saying goes, was taken out of thin air.

Yet taking personnel out of planned training in the battalion can't explain everything. The time found for training is also not used in the best possible way. Night firing which I had occasion to attend began two hours later than planned. It turned out that the schedule had not considered when night really fell and it is really awkward to call firing during daylight night firing.

The distressing results of winter training had little effect on the moral atmosphere in the battalion. The party and Komsomol organizations have no fundamental evaluation of the failures and you can see complacency in everyone. The information stand showing the course of socialist competition indicates good and excellent marks and wall newspapers about tactical training where personnel displayed poor weapons training are narrated in enthusiastic tones. The squad commanded by Sergeant N. Basevich was declared the best according to the results of weekly competition, yet it has been doing economic projects for three months.

When I shared my observations with officers from the regimental staff and expressed the opinion that it would be superfluous for seniors to have control over the quality of exercises, Lieutenant Colonel V. Lavrich, temporarily filling the position of unit commander, objected, "To substitute officers of the subunits is the last thing..."

The theses is correct. But is it possible to sit calmly in an office while subordinates are failing firing exercise after firing exercise and when they would be happy with a satisfactory mark before the end of the training year?

12511

CSO: 1801/022

GROUND FORCES

UNITS' NIGHT GUNNERY TRAINING RESULTS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Oct 84 p 1

[Article by Maj I. Esyutin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Lessons of Night Firing"]

[Text] Quiet had reigned for a while at the moving-target tank gunnery range, where the sub-unit firing training was being checked. The company under the command of Guards Sr Lt Yu. Sorokin was preparing itself for the last run. The results would determine whether or not the tankers had fulfilled their obligation. Everyone expectantly watched the teams which upon the command of the firing range officer hurried toward the tanks, which were parked at the starting line.

The company under the command of Guards Sr Lt Sorokin, as well as the battalion which it is a part of, were not considered lagging behind. True, during the last training period the company had fulfilled the obligation for weapons training, in the words of battalion commander Guards Capt N. Danilenkov "at the limits of their capabilities." Naturally, during the summer training period it was expected that both the battalion commander and the company officers would pay more attention to the firing training of tankers, removing deficiencies which had prevented them from attaining first place during the winter training period. Now the night firing must show how they had managed with this task.

The teams, having completed the exercise in the last run, did not live up to the expectations. The company returned from the firing range, not having attained the level attained in competition at the end of the training year. Why did this happen?

We turn the pages of the journal recording the firing which had taken place at the moving-target tank gunnery range during the summer training period. The first thing that hits us in the eye is the lack of stability in the results. The firing in the sub-unit went, so to speak, with variable success. The planned line indicating the teams' growth in mastery suddenly dropped, and alongside excellent scores were satisfactory ones.

Studying the documents, connected with the organization of the training process, it was not difficult to satisfy ourselves that the failures in the

tankers' gunnery training was not by chance. They coincided with the times that there were blanks on the graph for tank gunnery training. This is completely understandable: it is known that without systematic training, tankers cannot count on attaining accurate shooting.

Following the subordinates of Guards Sr Lt Sorokin, the company under the command of Guards Capt V. Obozov completed the firing exercise. Here, every other firer returned to the starting line with excellent results. All norms were fulfilled with a surplus. The "secret" of the company's success consisted in the fact that here during the entire training year a clear-cut rhythm of tank gunnery training was provided for. It was also said that thanks to the forces of the commander and the company party organization, the fight for accurate shooting became the affair of the entire military collective. In the sub-unit the firing circle actively worked, which was a great help for the tankers in gaining experience of the best specialists.

In the company which Guards Sr Lt Sorokin commands, the tank firing training was conducted irregularly. Before the test, an attempt was made to make up for the omissions. And in general, everything that was called for by the plan was carried out. But with what type of quality? It is a known fact that alarm has never brought success to anyone.

This time the same thing happened. Even several experienced firers were not able to stand out as masters at the test because due to the interruptions in training they lost much of their skill. For example, at one time, Guards Sr Lt S. Yevshin shot excellently from a tank. But during the test, no matter how he tried to stay within the bounds of the allotted time for completing the exercise, he was not successful. Such was also the fate of Guards Jr Sgt M. Khramtsov, who in the past was an excellent firer.

And what is thought regarding this at the unit headquarters? "A detailed analysis of the lessons of this night firing is still in the future," said regimental commander Guards Lt Col A. Grigorash. "But it is already clear that we, the unit management officers must think about this. The company results, as well as the battalion's, as a whole could probably be higher if we all more actively tried during the course of the year to stick to a strict observance of the training plan. Breaks in the tank firing training graph are far from always being the fault of the sub-unit commanders. Frequently they are the result of various branches not coordinating the planning of military training. We had instances of personnel being pulled out of training for something not connected with the study process. Such instances, of course, are rare. But one could allow for them in making up the plan if whoever was tasked with the job would approach it with more responsibility. We will take such an approach and will orient the headquarters officers in such a direction in the preparation for planning activities and training for the new training year. It would also be worthwhile to think about how to raise the effectiveness of monitoring the course of the training process, in particular, in conducting night activities. Moreover, this concerns not only night firing and tank firing training. We're talking about night training as a whole. There are still quite a few omissions and weaknesses here. We need to decisively end these."

Thus, the self-criticism of the regimental commander and other officers with whom I had the opportunity to talk after the firing attest to the fact that the lessons of the night activities did not slip past their attention. And now much will depend on how soon they put their words into action.

CSO: 1801/026

GROUND FORCES

PREPARATION FOR COMPANY TACTICAL EXERCISES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 6, Jun 84 pp 70-71

[Article by Colonel L. Merzlyak: "A Company Tactical Exercise"]

[Text] I. Preparation

Tactical exercises are the most effective form of training troops in the field and are an important means for enhancing the combat readiness of units and subunits. Subunits go to exercises in full strength with organic weapons, combat equipment and reinforcing means. The essence of this form of training is that the servicemen train to carry out combat missions during a single and constantly developing tactical situation.

The training exercises can be carried out using two sides or only one side. As a rule company tactical exercises are carried out using only one side. The enemy is designated by sets of target equipment and also by the actions of specially detailed soldiers. They are issued blank cartridges and smoke charges.

Company tactical exercises usually last 1 or 2 days. Their depth is planned taking into account the character of the terrain, the number of trainees assigned for combat training, fuel and also the size of the training fields (firing ranges) and terrain conditions.

The topic of exercises is determined by the predestination and training level of the personnel and the conditions and character of the terrain. It must embrace the entire complex of methods of carrying out combat actions. At the exercises the personnel work up fully the questions of carrying out combat with the ground and air enemy, reconnaissance, protection against mass destruction weapons and incendiaries of the enemy, stimulation of logistical and technical support of battle and also fire, engineer, technical and special training.

Company tactical exercises are carried out 4-6 times a year. For preparation and carrying out exercises team leaders are chosen from the officer staff and referees are appointed. A similar number of officers are included in these groups.

Tactical exercises are both the most effective and the most complicated form of training. Therefore, they must be thoroughly worked out. Preparation for a company tactical exercise is carried out under the direct leadership of the Bn CO and begins no later than 1 to 2 weeks before the rehearsal of combat actions. It is carried out according to the calendar plan which is drawn up by the exercise director and includes: defining and specifying the initial data for a company tactical exercise, the choice of the area and its on-the-spot reconnaissance, the drafting of documents and their specification on the terrain; the training of the team leaders, and subunit referees; completion of the major part of preparing the exercise area; conducting practice tactical exercises and marching drills and inspection of subunits' readiness.

Past combat training shows that when commanders thoroughly prepare for carrying out tactical exercises and display a creative approach, these exercises as a rule are instructive and interesting. We shall describe the organization of a company tactical exercise in a battalion under Major V. Kiselyov dealing with a participation of a company in an offensive operation.

Two weeks before company tactical exercises Major V. Kiselyov drew up a personal plan for getting ready for the exercises. He foresaw the time and sequence of going over with the personnel the clauses of combat manuals, regulations, conducting lessons on safety measures and passing the examinations by the personnel, tactical and marching drill exercises with the company and platoons, tactical exercises with company, platoon and section commanders and also maintenance of materiel and armament in the field.

The Bn CO's deputy for political affairs was also actively preparing for the company tactical exercise. He drew up the plan of Party-political work for the period of the company tactical exercise, gave the company deputy commander for political affairs the necessary instructions for participating in the exercise, helped him organize the activities of the Party and YCL activists, and mobilise all the personnel for qualitative preparations for practice battle.

For this purpose Party and Komsomol meetings were held in the subunits. A meeting with veterans of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) also took place. Propagandists gave talks to the personnel on the following topics: "What a Soldier Should Know To Advance Successfully?", "To Act Skillfully in a Practice Battle Is the Duty of Every Serviceman," "By Successes at Exercises We Shall Multiply the Unit Combat Traditions," and others. Combat bulletins, were published in every platoon and a wall newspaper was prepared in every company. Booklets were distributed among the servicemen. They contained specific recommendations on how one should act in field conditions.

The character and volume of direct preparation of subunits involved in a company tactical exercise are defined by concrete conditions.

As experience shows, the commanders spend the bulk of time during preparation for a company tactical exercise on defining and specifying basic data. As a rule they are: the topic of the exercise; training purposes; stages and their training questions; composition of the training sides, the area of carrying

out combat actions, their duration, expenditure of motor resources, ammunition and imitation means. The commander reflects the answers to all these questions in an explanatory note.

Let us analyse this part of preparing for an exercise by a concrete example. Having sized up the topic for a company tactical exercise assigned by the superior commander Bn CO Major V. Kiselyov began to spell out the training purposes to the participants.

Thus, the company and platoon commanders were assigned the mission of improving the skill in organising the offensive on the move, of exercising control over fire and subunits, of maintaining continuous cooperation in the course of the battle. Soldiers and sergeants were to be trained in handling weapons and to use skillfully combat equipment in the offensive.

The educational purpose according to the intentions of the Bn CO was to inculcate initiative and resolution in the personnel in a situation approximately resembling a combat reality.

After that Major V. Kiselyov defined the stages of the exercises and their content. Depending on the topic the number of stages may vary. At a company tactical exercise they may comprise from 3 to 4 stages. The training questions, which are formulated with maximum clarity by the commanders, and the character of combat missions carried out by subunits as a whole define the content of every stage. In each stage, depending on the period of combat actions and character of combat missions carried out by subunits, there may be 3 or 4 questions.

The period of the stages is made with due calculation of the general duration of exercises, their content and the level of their trainees' combat skill. It is important that the servicemen should act in a company tactical exercises as if in a combat situation, constantly taking into account the time factor. Therefore it is necessary to allot for the working up of organisation questions and the dynamics of combat and actions as much time as would be needed in a real battle.

As a result of the work carried out, the Bn CO chose four stages which found their expression in the calendar of carrying out a company tactical exercise. After specifying and defining the basic data, Major V. Kiselyov carried out on-the-spot reconnaissance of the area chosen for a company tactical exercise. The deputies and assistants of the exercise director were enlisted to work on the terrain.

During on-the-spot reconnaissance Major V. Kiselyov defined and specified the borders of the exercise area, departure areas for subunits, their combat missions and routes of advance, possible lines of deployment into pre-battle and battle formation, the main artillery positions, the composition, position and possible character of the enemy actions, the location of his strong points; the order of rehearsal of the subunit combat actions, the character and volume of measures for organising the area of exercises and the necessary types of manpower and equipment for carrying out these works, the locations

for control points and organisation of communication, the areas of concentration of subunits after exercises and the order of their return to the areas of permanent location, safety measures concerning the protection of state, or collective farm property and the personal property of the population.

After on-the-spot reconnaissance the Bn CO gave the instructions to the chief of staff, his deputies and assistants for preparing the area of combat actions, specifying the plan of carrying out a company tactical exercise; working up of particular plans; a plan of imitation, the scheme of the layout of training targets and preparation of referees. The layout of training targets was organised in accordance with the tactical intentions of the exercise. The order and duration of illuminating targets and imitation of their fire was also defined.

As a result of the work done the following documents were drawn up: the plan of carrying out a company tactical exercise; personal plans of the exercise director, his deputies and umpires and the plan of imitation.

A week before the exercise Major V. Kiselyov presented the plan of carrying out the company tactical exercise to the regimental commander. The plan was drawn up on a map and included basic data, tactical intentions, calendar of carrying out the company tactical exercise and the main indices of the exercise.

The subunit commanders were preparing for exercises during the planned lessons. All measures were reflected in the plan of combat training and political education of the battalion and in the curricula. Special exercises were carried out with the personnel detached for carrying out imitation. Safety lessons were given to each subunit and all soldiers and sergeants passed the examinations.

(To be continued in the next issue)

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 6, 1984

CSO: 1812/24

GROUND FORCES

TANK CAPTAIN DESCRIBES COMPANY TRAINING

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 6, Jun 84 pp 22-23

[Text] A tank company under Captain Valery Lobkanov is considered one of the best in the unit. It achieved high results in combat training and political education. The personnel competently solve tactical and fire missions and accurately destroy targets with all types of tank weapons. Officers, sergeants and soldiers, and particularly the company commander greatly contribute to this. Valery himself skillfully drives a fighting vehicle. He is a crack shot confident in any tactical situation. For the successes in combat training Lobkanov was awarded For the Distinguished Services medal.

We give the floor to Captain V. Lobkanov.

Team-work of a Crew

It is not so easy for me to give a simple answer to the question: "What was it that helped us the most to achieve high results in firing accuracy?" The tense labour of a large collective takes shape from many elements. Fire training, for example, includes the knowledge of materiel, its capabilities, ability to observe the target and to accurately define the distance to it, etc. To my mind there are two groups of elements on which firing accuracy depends first of all. They are a crew's team-work and tank gunnery training.

The following episode has been stamped in my memory. The company was carrying out firing exercises. The personnel delivered fire with organic shells. Some gun layers did not cope with the prescribed rates and were late in making the fixed number of rounds. It is clear that these crews got bad marks. At the time someone frankly said "The gun layers were to blame!" But why only they? If the hits are excellent the whole of the crew stand high in everybody's esteem, and if the crew miss, it's only the gun layers' fault. Such a judgement is wrong. In this case only the inadequate team-work of the crews let the tankmen down. This lesson was of benefit to them. The tankmen made sure once again that an accurate shot depends not only on the gun layer but on the other members of the crew as well. I summoned the platoon leaders and we discussed once again what a tank commander, a gun layer, and a driver-mechanic must do for an accurate shot. After that we drew up a training time-table. Actions of each crew member were calculated down to the second. A strict time limit for the fulfillment of one or other evolution heightened the men's sense of responsibility. They now acted more concertedly and their consciousness

increased. It is well known that a driver-mechanic, before he makes a shot, chooses a plane sector on the ground within the few seconds allotted to him. It is natural that he must be very circumspect so as not to spoil an accurate shot by a superfluous turn, and must inform a gun layer about an even sector of the terrain (path).

A tank commander beginning to move when the gun layer cannot observe the battlefield (a gun is on the loading line) must be also very attentive and, when a target suddenly appears, must give immediately an exact command to the firer.

Literally several seconds, are allotted for specifying the range, laying and firing.

We checked our calculations. Of course not everybody managed to cope with these demands at once. Some gun layers were late in doing all prescribed operations between the first and second shots. This delay affected precision in tankmen's actions. So as to increase the accuracy of the basic data the driver-mechanics were recommended in case of such delays to report to the gun layer about the distance covered. The command ordered all crew members to double the watch over the battlefield in their sectors, efficiently report the appearance of targets and to adjust their fire correctly.

After such training sessions (actions within the time limit) every crew acquired its own style and rhythm of combat activity. Accuracy of fire was increasing. The whole crew began to concentrate on gunnery.

Tank Gunnery Training

One of the components of our stable results in fire training is a business-like creative situation at the exercises. Frequently I personally conduct tank gunnery training lessons, and am present at them in platoons. Some platoons carry out training exercises in tanks, others execute fire missions and work up training standards. They do what the tankmen usually do at such exercises.

We plan lessons and exercises so that the tankmen spend the major part of time with weapons, directly at the control panel. We have all the facilities for this. On a firing range there are enough tanks installed on rocking frames and there is a target range panel with feedback information.

At tank gunnery training sessions we necessarily work up boarding a tank and unboarding it. We do not spend much time on this because our men are well trained. But we derive a great benefit from it. It is also necessary for combat. Of course, we spend more time during training sessions on laying a gun, drawing an "envelope" and "spirals", and executing fire missions with frequent shifting or lifting fire from one target to another. Here it is very important not to violate the principle of succession in training, i.e., from the simple to the complicated. At the beginning, for example, we train the men to fire without a stabiliser and then with it, from stationary position and on the move.

This is undoubtedly a well known truth. But it doesn't hurt to call it to mind. A desire to achieve high results as soon as possible usually leads to deviations from the simple to the complicated principle and, in the final analysis, to failure. Practice has shown that a high fire training standard can be achieved provided the commander strictly follows orders, works creatively with an eye to the future, and is fully aware that the outcome of a battle largely depends on the speed and accuracy of firing.

Officers and sergeants of the company understand these demands and explain them to their subordinates. Therefore strenuous tank gunnery training sessions are held with great benefit. Working out preparatory exercises and variants of designating targets, we see to it that our trainees not only detect them and take a decision, but also define in what succession and with what weapon to deliver fire at them.

To make an accurate shot it is very important that the crews exactly know their mission, reference points, and be able to quickly and correctly determine angles between the target and the reference points and the distance to them. For this purpose during initial trainings we put the targets at a small distance from one another and in narrow sectors. Later on distances and angles of vision were increased so that the crews would learn to carry out observation on a broad frontage. Some fire missions were executed with a simultaneous demonstration of two or three targets. Later on distances and angles of vision were increased so that the crews would study to carry out observation on a broad frontage. Some fire missions were executed with a simultaneous demonstration of two or three targets, with their various alternation. All crews trained directly on tanks. Conventions during the working out of exercises were reduced to the minimum. In this case we saw to it that the tankmen would confine themselves to the definite normatives. Now we did not carry out a single tank gunnery training session without working up training standards on a simulator. Besides, the servicemen learn to sort out rounds by the type of shells. And as a rule, all crews of the company carry out the stowage of ammunition establishment within the time set.

Wherever the training takes place--on a firing range, a tank directrix or elsewhere--it is always instructive. The tankmen learn to skillfully handle the organic weapons in conditions of limited visibility, in using special outfit to ensure protection against the mass destruction weapons, when packings with artillery shells and machine gun cartridge belts are placed not only inside the tank but also far from it. The time of fulfilling training standards has been gradually reduced to 20 percent less than the standard one. I want to underscore that the combination of training sessions on trainers and organic materiel is yielding positive results. Now the fighting men carry out exercises in firing and driving better than before.

Firing at maximum distances demands much attention. This firing has its own peculiarities. We take them into consideration during exercises in fire training. Here are some of them. For one, such gunnery can be carried out only from the halt or a stationary position. In this case fire at a target is delivered by several tanks or by a subunit. Consequently, fire control, accurate target designation, skillful organisation of firing and correct fire adjustment are of paramount importance.

It is known that if the distance to a target exceeds 2,500 m, the fire range is defined visually with considerable mistakes. Therefore adjustment fire precedes firing at such distances.

We usually train the company's personnel to fire at maximum distances during tank gunnery sessions for platoons and companies. A fire mission is executed in three stages: preparation for firing, adjustment of fire and fire for effect. In this case we use special trainers, aiming rests and terrain mock-ups in training areas.

I bring the training plan to the platoon commanders' notice and they brief the crew leaders on it. Fire missions are assigned to every platoon commander. Officers improve their skills in measuring distances by various ways and in fire control while soldiers and sergeants increase their expertise in reception and transmission of target designation, delivery of a volley, deliberate and running fire.

There are quite a few other ways of boosting fire training standards. It is difficult to cover everything in one article. The major point here is painstaking, strenuous work. There is no limit to perfecting combat skill.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 6, 1984

CSO: 1812/24

GROUND FORCES

'ENVELOPMENT,' 'TURNING MOVEMENT' DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 6, Jun 84

[From the Questions and Answers section: "When Is an Envelopment and a Turning Movement Used?"]

[Text] It is not as easy to answer this question as it may at first seem. First of all it is necessary to make clear what each of these two types of manoeuvre are.

By envelopment is meant a manoeuvre for positioning oneself for a flank attack (manoeuvring around flanks) on the enemy battle formation usually with manpower and equipment acting from the front with the purpose of successfully fulfilling the assigned mission. Depending on the situation envelopment may be carried out in battle or prebattle formations by a part of the forces or by the main forces of a subunit carrying out combat actions.

A turning movement is a deeper manoeuvre of subunits to the depth of the enemy battle formation to deliver a surprise blow at the rear of his troops. Like an envelopment, a turning movement is used when there are open flanks and gaps in the combat formations of the enemy manpower and equipment, but only in tactical cooperation with the manpower and equipment acting from the front.

Envelopments and turning movements were widely used by the Soviet forces during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) in different kinds of battles--on the offensive when the enemy battle formations had gaps and exposed flanks, in a meeting engagement, when repulsing counterattacks and when pursuing the retreating enemy.

The success of these kinds of manoeuvre in all cases will depend on whether sufficient manpower and equipment are assigned for delivering a blow at the enemy flank and rear, on the speed and reserved character of advancement of the subunits executing the manoeuvre, the effectiveness of cooperation with the forces acting from the front, and on surprise and resolute actions.

Increased troop mobility, and greater fire and striking power create favourable conditions for a more wider use of an envelopment and a turning movement in combination with a breakthrough of the enemy defences and other actions of the forces.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War and of modern-day warfare show that envelopment requires that subunits of a section-platoon level be assigned to solve not so deep tactical missions and that turning movements should be executed at the company or battalion level. The reason for this is as follows.

In the first case solving the tasks of defeating the enemy by fire in the interests of the subunits executing the envelopment is the prerogative of the commander acting from the front. Therefore the depth of combat actions may reach the maximum range of the effective mortar, artillery and ATGM fire and other fire weapons which support and sometimes secure the battle of a section or platoon. It is not excluded that in separate cases, especially when enveloping the enemy from two flanks, a Mts Inf Coy or a Tk Coy may be detailed for carrying out the manoeuvre.

In the second case a company or battalion commander performs a fire mission as a rule with organic and attached manpower and equipment. In this case the senior commander will support operations of the subunit, executing a turning movement more often than not with long range fire means of destroying the enemy and with aviation. Past exercises show that the depth of actions of a subunit executing a turning movement may reach 10-15 km and in specific conditions (in mountains, deserts, marshy and wooded country, etc.) even more.

In each specific case the decision to make a turning movement or an envelopment is made by the commander depending on the character of the enemy actions, the availability of manpower and equipment for carrying out a manoeuvre, on terrain and on the concept of battle.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 6, 1984

CSO: 1812/24

GROUND FORCES

CONDITIONS, PROBLEMS IN MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION DISCUSSED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy: "At the Highest Echelon"]

[Text] Colonel Vladimir Sergeyevich Bogdanovskiy has been appointed as permanent KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Carpathian Military District. We call readers' attention to his correspondence.

This is not the first year that the personnel of the Samaro-Ul'yanovsk, Berdichev, Zheleznaya Motorized Rifle Division have participated in the struggle for the title of outstanding unit (soyedineniye) in the Ground Forces. There are appreciable achievements in the division's aktiv. The Samaro-Ul'yanovsk men successfully completed the past training year and showed a high level of combat training in the spring of this training year. In summing up the results of the winter training, the subunits (podrazdeleniya) commanded by Major A. Popov, captains V. Govorushchenko, Ye. Shelest, A. Sklyarov and others especially distinguished themselves. In April, about 70 percent of the division's communists gained or confirmed the title of "outstanding" soldier in combat and political training. It is precisely they who are setting the tone in training and competition.

However, the test exercises conducted after the first weeks of the summer training showed that some of the battalions had been deluded by their results. Not all commanders observed a methodically sound sequence in training subordinates and sometimes speeded up events, resorting to coaching on specific exercises and tasks. All this caused serious concern in the headquarters, political section and the party organization of the directorate. Experienced specialists in the methodology of teaching were sent to the subunits. Colonels V. Sumarokov and V. Volgushev, Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Antropov and majors S. Kravchenko and M. Bondar' conducted instructional classes with the platoon, company and battery commanders. Several demonstrations on the most complex topics were also prepared. During them, much attention was focused on organizing competition according to tasks and norms. Inspection competitions were also held for the best training materials base, barracks, mess hall, motor pool, guard room and Lenin Room. The results of the competitions were taken into account in determining the standings of the regiments in the competition. Senior comrades, party and Komsomol

committees of units (chast') and the political department of the unit (soyedineniye) began to pay more attention to preparing for young officer day, rallies and evening meetings in honor of outstanding trainees. A fundamental analysis helped find ways to increase the effectiveness of educational work and to replenish its arsenal. If an activity is prepared for young officers, it is bound to broaden their professional knowledge, equip them with knowledge of progressive methods and create enthusiasm.

In order to revitalize and make the competition between regiments more objective, they decided to plan the sessions so that the subunits from the various units work concurrently on the same theme at the firing ranges and tank gunnery ranges. Under these conditions, it is easier to see where the training is higher and the successes are greater. Staff officers and the unit political department take care of the publicity.

It has become a rule in the division to summarize in detail the competition between the units and subunits. This cuts people to the quick and brings them up short. Party committees and buros also participate in assessing the results of training and competition.

Once rosy reports were coming in from the battalion commanded by Major V. Tomchuk concerning the quality of classes and training sessions and the high skills of personnel. Lieutenant Colonel V. Babyak and Major M. Sharipov attended the summing up of the month's competition and saw a different picture than the reports painted. Later, using specific facts, they proved that the battalion was lagging behind in fulfilling its obligations. Getting ahead of myself, I will say that this has been beneficial.

In other units, Captain V. Lun'o and senior lieutenants A. Barsuk and V. Duranichev were subjected to sharp, well-founded criticism for oversights in organization of the training process and competition. This was not the kind of criticism which caused the young officers to lose heart. It was a combination of business-like recommendations and assistance. When the subordinates of Captain V. Lun'o, let's say, are working at the tank gunnery range, you can also see Lieutenant Colonel V. Dresvyannikov there. The experienced methodologist generously shares his knowledge and skills with the young comrades. The subunit which formerly was lagging behind now takes the lead in weapon training and driving combat vehicles. Under night conditions, the subordinates of Captain V. Lun'o are able to set an example for others.

In the summer training period, the staff and political department of the division, with active participation by party organizations, summarized the progressive methods of training and educating subordinates accumulated by communists captains S. Anisimov, Ye. Krasnov, M. Vakkaus and A. Sklyarov and Senior Lieutenant Yu. Trusov. Captain M. Vakkaus, by way of illustration, by right is considered one of the most skilled organizers of competition directly in the dynamics of the lessons. The officer cannot conceive training without competitiveness, and his methods have interested many.

Other company commanders are adopting Captain A. Sklyarov's experience of working with the sergeants. In this subunit in particular, commander training of the sergeants is well established. Master Sergeant I. Moskalik and

Sergeant N. Buts' successfully handled even platoon commander duties at one of the crucial training sessions.

In the course of summer training, much attention is given to field training competitions of sister subunits. The competitions are dedicated to the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War. The best of the best in the festive situation are presented pennants and prizes and certificates with the names of hero-soldiers from their unit.

Among the problems which they are anxious to resolve in the division are the so-called "mediocrities". The results of recent checking exercises showed that a number of platoons and companies are content with mediocre results in firing and driving. The battalion commanded by Major Ye. Nazarov even lost ground. The subordinates of Major A. Parashchuk have not yet made the gains called for by the obligations. Shortcomings in engineer and reconnaissance training are characteristic of a number of subunits. Here complaints are made against the chiefs of the corresponding services as well.

Simply put, the unit (soyedineniye) has unused reserves. One of them is to improve further competition and increase the effectiveness of the movement to ensure that the name of the division is always on the list of the best and progressive ones.

12567

CSO: 1801/021

GROUND FORCES

SEARCH OPERATION EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 84 pp 11-13

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel M. Romanov]

[Text]

The search is one of the most complicated methods of reconnaissance. It consists in the secret approach of a sub-unit (group) detailed for reconnaissance to a planned and closely studied objective in good time, an unexpected attack against this objective with the purpose of capturing POWs, documents, samples of armament and combat equipment. It can be carried out on any terrain, at any time of the year, mainly by night or in other conditions of limited visibility (heavy rain, snow-storm, mist).

The experience of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) and postwar exercises has shown that the success of a search depends, first of all, on the high combat training standard of soldiers and sergeants detailed for reconnaissance, on their ability to skillfully get their bearings on the terrain and to move noiselessly in the dark, to competently use the technique of close combat, and on their initiative, resourcefulness and mutual assistance.

A thorough organisation of a search both by the sub-unit commander detailed for reconnaissance, and by the chief in charge of preparing a search is of paramount importance.

Let us examine this point on the example of a tactical exercise (see Sketch No. 1).

At 0600 hrs on July 23, Lieutenant V. Solovyov, commander of the 1st Mts Inf Pl, was summoned to the FEBA of the friendly forces where he was assigned a combat mission. On the night of July 23-24, his platoon was to carry out a search and to take a "POW" on the south-eastern slopes of Hill 1236. The objective of the search was a machine-gun crew located in a gap between the "enemy" platoon strong points. Two combat engineers were attached to the platoon; its actions were secured by the fire of an artillery battalion and a Mts Inf Coy holding defences on the forward edge.

Lieutenant Solovyov, having sized up the mission, was to ascertain the most advantageous approaches to the objective of the search, "enemy" behaviour in the area of the coming actions, and his obstacle and fire system, to

map out the approach route to the objective of a search and return route, places of making gaps in the "enemy" obstacles.

At 0700 hrs, after briefing the personnel on the mission, the lieutenant led the platoon to the FEBA. He distributed his subordinates by pairs and assigned them their missions: to observe the machine-gun crew, to determine how it draws duty, the availability of defensive installations and fire weapons in the area of the search and on the flanks, particularly those which would be able to impede the platoon's actions, the most advantageous approaches to the objective of the search, and reference points.


At 1500 hrs the platoon commander gathered his subordinates on the observation point and listened to their reports one by one.

After Lieutenant Solovyov analysed the results of the observation he designated check points, defined the azimuth of movement and the direction of a secret approach to the objective of the attack and the order of withdrawal after capturing a prisoner of war.

As to the battle formation he decided to have an attacking subgroup and two support subgroups. He decided to use two combat engineers for making gaps in the "enemy" obstacles. The section under Sergeant S. Krylov was to operate as an attacking subgroup. His subordinates were noted for their strength, adroitness, self-control and composure, they were skilled in sambo. Two other sections headed by Sergeants V. Panov and T. Skvortsov comprised the support subgroups. The servicemen of these sections skillfully handled their weapons and accurately threw hand grenades in the dark.

Issuing the order, the platoon commander paid particular attention to the organisation of cooperation. The success of a combat mission depends to a great extent on how well soldiers and sergeants react to any situation.

After the commander issued the combat order he specified the procedure of actions during the attack against the objective and withdrawal, fire support of the artillery



Sketch No. 1

battalion and the Mts Inf Coy, and indicated areas and lines against which a concentrated and barrage fire was prepared and the signals of calling for and ceasing fire. He also specified the order of passing positions of the friendly forces. In conclusion Lieutenant Solovyov informed the personnel about the signals of warning, control and cooperation and the order of actions by them and the password.

Having left only two observers from the subgroup of support on the forward edge Lieutenant Solovyov withdrew the platoon in the rear and organized the training of the personnel on ground similar to the area of the upcoming actions. At first the personnel worked up individual actions of the servicemen by elements, then by sections and the platoon. Here great attention was paid to noiselessly making gaps in the "enemy" obstacles, and quickly overcoming them and to skillfully taking advantage of the camouflaging characteristics of the terrain. Solovyov reminded once again that the enemy can discover and observe reconnaissance men with night vision devices and radar equipment even without illuminating the ground with flares.

As is known, the most crucial moment in a search is the attack on the objective and capture of a POW. When working up this question the platoon leader saw to it that the reconnaissance men detailed to the attacking subgroup would act resolutely and courageously and approach the objective of the search as closely as possible.

The return after having captured a POW was also thoroughly worked up.

At the last stage the commanders of the supporting subunits were also involved in the training.

Before darkness the platoon advanced to the assault position. The lieutenant checked weapons, ammunition, specified by ground features the route of advance to the objective of the search and the return route. When it became dark, combat engineers were the first to start advancing under the cover of the 2nd Section. They were followed by the sections in the order defined by the platoon commander.

The reconnaissance men overcame the "enemy" mine fields noiselessly. The "enemy" showed no activity.

The nearer the men approached the objective of the search, the more carefully they acted. The attacking subgroup managed to steal up to within 10-12 m of a machine-gun crew.

The attack ensued after the flare, which soared behind the reconnaissance men, became dim. It was so impetuous that the "enemy" soldiers even had no time to open fire. Having captured a "POW" the reconnaissance men began to withdraw. The attacking subgroup with a "POW" was moving the first. It was followed by support subgroups. When the reconnaissance men approached the gap in obstacles, several flares soared upwards from the strong point on Hill 123.6 and a heavy machine gun opened up. Comprising up to an infantry section, the "enemy" attacked the reconnaissance men at the flank from the side of the strong point in ruins. At that time the platoon commander, who was with a support subgroup, was "severely wounded." Sergeant Skvortsov assumed command over the platoon. He ordered the 2nd Section by fire from stationary positions to beat off the "enemy" attack and call the artillery fire on strong points on Hill 123.6 and on ruins.

When repulsing the attack three soldiers of the 2nd Section were "wounded." Sergeant Skvortsov ordered to the section leader to withdraw and to organize evacuation of the wounded while he with one section took up position before the passage in obstacles.

The 3rd Section, having taken up a fire position, secured a withdrawal through obstacles of the 1st and 2nd sections. The latter, in their turn, having sent forward the "POW" and the "wounded," occupied a position behind obstacles and secured the 3rd Section's withdrawal. The servicemen safely reached their forward edge, having successfully fulfilled their combat mission.

IN BROAD DAYLIGHT

During the Great Patriotic War the search was one of the most widespread methods of combat reconnaissance and was frequently carried out under cover of night. However, a great number of searches was carried out in daytime as well. Thus, one of the armies from July 1944 to May 1945 carried out 1,838 searches, including 1,367 by night and 471 by day. Some 693 POWs were captured during night searches and 378 during day searches.

As an example we cite a search organised in the summer of 1944 and carried out at noon, when the sun was shining brightly.

The nazis had turned a height, dominating over the surrounding terrain and called Lysaya Gora by the fighting men, into a powerful strong point (see Sketch No. 2). On the north-eastern slopes facing the Soviet forces, they had dug two full size trenches 100-150 m from one another.

During battles to improve its positions a company of the 2nd Bn of the 594th Infantry Regiment rushed to the height and captured the first trench but was unable to move forward, as the nazis put up a stubborn resistance from the second trench and a communication trench not yet fully dug. The company commander received the order to consolidate in the captured trench.


Protected by obstacles, the nazis felt safe during the day and gradually they lowered their guard. By day they set only one observation post consisting of two men, but when it became dark the enemy infantry occupied the trench and communication trench.

The order was given to clear Lysaya Gora of the enemy. So far as the Bn CO did not possess complete information about enemy manpower and equipment on the return slope, it was decided to carry out a search and capture a POW.

A two-men observation post located in the communication trench some 60 m from the main trench had been chosen as the objective of the search. In the middle of the day when the sun was rather hot, the observers sought shelter in the shadow of the trench overhead cover.

The commander and his staff displayed a creative approach to the search plan. It was decided to carry it out by day. Since the post was located nearby and was well observed from the trench, it was decided not to send forward the group of fire support but to place it on the left flank of the company. In case of necessity this subgroup jointly with a heavy machine-gun crew was to prevent the movement of the enemy reinforcements by fire from stationary position.

So as not to put the enemy on his guard, combat engineers of the obstacle removing subgroup on the night prior to the search were only to deliver a distributed charge on the friendly mine field and to set off an explosion immediately before the capturing subgroup started its advance.



Sketch No. 2

Various subunits took part in combat security and support of the search. Fire sectors for heavy machine guns located on the flanks, allowed them to overlap with cross fire the approaches to the observation post. The artillery prepared a sector of concentrated fire (No. 102) at the reverse slopes of Lysaya Gora and a single-shot standing barrage (Akatsiya) before the enemy trench.

The fighting men for the capturing subgroup were selected with particular care and thoroughness. Five of the most experienced, hardy, quick and physically strong soldiers were included in this subgroup. Senior Sergeant E. Berseglyan, a courageous and resourceful non-commissioned officer, was at the head of this subgroup.

For several days running the subgroup had been training hard on the sector of the terrain resembling the one where the objective of the search was located. The actions of the fighting men were timed and literally every step was worked up.

In the middle of the day combat engineers blasted a distributed charge, and the artillery men and mortar men delivered a blow at the reverse slopes of the height, preventing the nazis from taking their places in the trench. The company opened up at the trench and the subgroup of support, while the capturing subgroup was overcoming the gap in the mine field and deploying into a skirmish line, was firing upon the observation post.

When the fighting men under E. Berseglyan approached the objective of the search at a distance of 20 m the fire at this post was stopped. On command of Berseglyan, the fighting men showered grenades upon the sector of the communication trench adjoining the post and rushed into the trench. One observer was killed while the second one was captured and delivered to the friendly forces' trench.

None of the participants in the search was killed or wounded. The fighting men spent only five minutes on the entire operation.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No. 8, 1984

CSO: 1801/51

GROUND FORCES

COMPANY TACTICAL EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 84 pp 16, 18

[Article by Colonel L. Merzlyak]

[Text]

No. 3 — CRITIQUE

An instructive critique is of great training and educational importance. It allows the trainees to understand deeply the events going on at tactical exercises, develops their tactical thinking, trains them to critically analyse their actions and helps them correctly to estimate the mistakes made. A critique is very important not only for trainees but also for the exercise director, as it allows him to analyse the subordinates' field training standard, to determine better the level of their combat training.

Collection of materials for a critique begins before exercises and proceeds during them. The necessary data should be ready by the end of company tactical exercises.

The major theoretical points of the questions elaborated on company tactical exercises and the necessary illustrative examples from the experience of the past wars and troop exercises and also the necessary schemes and drawings are usually prepared prior to the exercises. During exercises the Bn CO prepares all necessary data on the basis of

his personal observation of the actions of the commanders under training and subunits and also reports of his deputies (assistants) and officers of the staff.

A critique should be carried out while the events of the exercise are still fresh in the servicemen's memory. It is not recommended to overload the analysis of the trainees' actions with secondary questions and details. The emphasis should be laid on the main thing—the estimation of personnel's combat skill and commander's actions.

The following is an example of how Major V. Kiselyov made the critique of a company tactical exercise. He did so in three stages. First he discussed the personnel's actions, then, separately, those of the junior commanders and finally, of the officers.

Why did the commander choose precisely this method of carrying out a critique of company tactical exercises? First of all it ensures the concreteness, thoroughness and purposefulness of a critique.

How did this pan out concretely?

Analysing the personnel's

actions at the exercises, Major Kiselyov, after making a general assessment, proceeded to analyse the work of individual fighting men. Thus, the Bn CO noted that senior driver-mechanic of the company, Yefreitor A. Petrov, was the first to arrive at the depot and to start the engine of his vehicle. He also worked irreproachably during the march and directly in the process of combat activities. But he also made some mistakes, and the exercise director pointed them out.

"So, you acted very well," concluded Major Kiselyov, "but you have probably forgotten that you are a senior driver-mechanic. Before the commanders arrived at the depot you should have organised the work of the driver-mechanics. But you failed to do so. As a result not all the vehicles left the depot in time. Why didn't you organise it? I think you felt awkward about giving orders to your comrades. But it is a wrong attitude and should be suppressed. Also during combat activity you should have helped your comrades more actively. I think I won't be mistaken if I say that you haven't mastered the related speciality of gun layer-operator thoroughly enough. You should work more on this speciality."

The exercise director gave an example of a concrete businesslike critique. The platoon commanders and section leaders continued a critique with each of their subordinates. They analysed in detail the soldiers' actions. Everyone was assigned a concrete mission and instructed on how to fulfil it. As is well known, a clear idea of the perspective and firm belief in its achievement is a good stimulus for active work.

The critique of noncommissioned officers was also a concrete one. The Bn CO evaluated the actions of the sergeants at the exercises, and pointed out the positive elements and the mistakes.

The main shortcoming in the machine-gun section of Sergeant Borisov, for example, boiled down to the fact that the servicemen were not efficient enough, and fussed. This affected the time spent and the quality of fulfilling the normatives. What conclusions were drawn by the section leader?

"It is necessary to train harder, to do supplementary practising of the sequence of actions during servicemen's personal time," Sergeant Borisov offered.

"Do not be in a hurry to take your subordinates' personal time away from them," suggested Major Kiselyov. "Better think why are specialists fussing? I think they want to help each other but they don't know how to do it. Remember, we repeatedly spoke of the necessity to master related specialities. Everyone must completely visualise the actions of a machine-gun crew from the beginning to the end. Only in this case one can speak about team-work and, consequently, about mutual assistance. Mutual assistance must be based not only on enthusiasm but also on skill."

Junior Sergeant Leonov had a question: Why was the crew of Junior Sergeant Mannin, and not his, named the best? Leonov's crew did show the same good results, but his subordinates did not always maintain discipline. In the departure area, for example, they did not keep strictly to the rules of camouflage.

"Consequently, your major task is to enhance discipline," Major Kiselyov concluded his conversation with sergeants.

When carrying out a critique with officers, the Bn CO usually enumerates the topic and purpose of exercises, explains the tactical concept and then analyses subunit combat actions by stages. During a critique the theoretical aspects of the most important tactical problems, and requirements of orders which regulate combat training of troops may be expounded.

Analyses of combat actions are usually considered in the following sequence: decisions of the commanders, their expediency and justification; effectiveness of using destructive means by subunits; measures securing the successful fulfilment of the assigned mission; the work of the commanders to ensure continuous and firm troop control during combat; the subunit's actions, the most characteristic and instructive episodes, examples of the initiative of separate officers, sergeants and soldiers; the efficiency of the political work methods, and the level of military discipline.

When evaluating the decisions of the platoon commanders and subunits' actions, the Bn CO did not state categorically that one subunit was defeated or annihilated and the other won a victory. This can be done only on the basis of the results of a real battle. Therefore, he was talking about the supposed results and consequences of these or

those decisions and actions of the trainees, about the probable degree to which combat missions were carried out and about possible success or failure.

For example, the platoon under Lieutenant Morozov was not up to the mark in comparison with the others. He found many mistakes made by his subordinates but he did not notice his own errors. And these were the errors that had led to the platoon's unsuccessful actions.

During the critique Major Kiselyov noted that the personnel of the platoon did not act as energetically as the others. Why? Because the platoon commander did not assign precise combat missions to his subordinates. It is a well-known fact that a call not backed up by concrete work will ensure neither effectiveness, nor quality. Completing the critique, the exercise director defined to what extent the practice missions were mastered, assessed the work of the commanders, teamwork and field training standards of subunits and assigned missions so as to correct the mistakes detected.

A thorough and comprehensive critique heightens the responsibility of the officers and men for carrying out their service duty, and strengthens their moral and psychological qualities. At such critiques they make certain that not a single mistake goes unnoticed. Therefore with every coming exercise every effort is made to act strictly according to the regulations.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 8, 1984

CSO: 1801/51

GROUND FORCES

BATTERY COMMANDERS NOW YOUNGER, LESS EXPERIENCED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by Col V. Zababurin, a staff officer of the Red Banner Odessa Military District: "Combat Will Be Severely Demanding"]

[Text] A motorized rifle battalion was attacking "the enemy," who had fortified a position on the slopes of a dominating height, and driving into the depths of his defense. Having committed their reserve to combat, the defenders halted the motorized riflemen on a flat piece of terrain which was well-covered by fire. The battalion commander ordered the attached mortar battery to support the attacking forces with fire.

Capt V. Sidorov, the battery commander, quickly set up a command and observation post, assigned the mission of locating targets by intersection, and set down to the preparation of his data to fire. At this point, the radio telephone operator reported the readiness of the mortar crews. The battery fired a salvo. A number of the rounds impacted in the target's vicinity, but several deviated from it by as much as 600 meters.

Such a considerable target deviation surprised the subunit commander. He began rechecking the data, but only after a number of carefully fired rounds did he discover the reason for the original deviation: several of his mortar crews had, in their haste, set the rounds incorrectly.

In a word, it took more rounds for the battery to execute its mission than was necessary. The commander even failed to go up onto the height.

There are other instances in training when mortar subunit commanders become flustered and are late with their fire. For example, Capt V. Dedyshko who made a mistake in locating an enemy fire position lost much time in correcting his fire. As a result, the motorized riflemen ended up in a very difficult situation.

One would think that these facts would be thoroughly analyzed on the basis of principles at the exercise's critique. However, the regimental commander and his deputies were condescending with regard to the mortarmen's mistakes; the mistakes were explained as the result of the battery commanders' youth. That is to say, young commanders become flustered when their senior commanders

are present. Even more annoying is the fact that Lt Col I. Ivanchenko, the regimental artillery commander, also accepted this excuse.

Moreover, we must not explain and justify anything on the basis of the subunit commanders' youth. There are instances when officers who have commanded their batteries for 5 and 6 years and are greatly experienced in fire control also miss their targets. As it now stands, we have, as a rule, officers who have only recently graduated from our military schools commanding batteries. Reality itself demands that we train them in a new way; we need to look more intensively for ways of building psychological stability and a high degree of professionalism in our young commanders.

The reason for the hesitation on the part of our battery commanders in training can be explained not by their youth, but by the lack of proper attention to the mortar officers on the part of the regimental commander and the chief of the artillery, Lt Col I. Ivanchenko. It turned out that after an exercise, there is no well-defined training with the mortar officers of the unit. Weekly training exercises, without which combat readiness is difficult to maintain, are conducted irregularly. All the excuses in the world are made to cancel them or postpone them to a much later date.

Lt Col Ivanchenko is not bothered with the postponement of training exercises, nor does he care about making the artillery fire exercises varied and instructional. The training is conducted on the basis of obsolete methods and without taking into account the increasing rates of advance in combat and the need to execute fire and tactical missions as quickly as possible. Modern combat conditions obligate a mortar officer to master a multitude of target ranging variants and acquire the skill to select those targets which best meet the demands of a specific situation. It was especially the breath of professional vision and general purpose skills which the regiment's battery commanders did not have.

A person who hopes to get by with only the minimum amount of skill condemns himself unwittingly to failure. For example, in the heat of battle, Lt V. Anisimov was ordered to defeat "the enemy" who was positioned in a trench. The officer set about positioning his guns. A round was fired. The cloud of the explosion split the trench in two parts; it had been a direct hit. All that remained was for the lieutenant to give the order to fire for effect. The young officer, however, hesitated. He finally reported that the shot was short and added 200 meters. He clearly overshot his target with this. Only after having dropped 100 meters did the lieutenant fire for effect. When I asked why this had not been done immediately after the first accurate shot, V. Anisimov confessed that he could range well only by bracketing his target and that he preferred to do it this way.

Once again I will emphasize: it is not youth which is responsible for the hesitant actions of any mortar officers in combat but poor training. The regiment about which I am speaking does not train in the field and conducts less night training than it is supposed to. Battery commanders conduct few joint short tactical exercises with motorized rifle company commanders.

The experiences of outstanding units prove my point: young mortar battery commanders are capable of mastering all the secrets of expert fire control, and

in the quickest time too. We only have to find the right methodology, strictly adhere to training schedules and plans, skillfully utilize the mobilizing strength of socialist competition, and, of course, make sure our senior commanders are very exacting.

I was gratified to know the young artillery officers of the unit in which Lt Col Ye. Gorbylev serves. Every fire mission during fire exercises and careful fire command and control are worked out here against a complicated tactical backdrop and in the interests of the combined-arms subunits. They drew the following conclusion in the unit: the destruction of all targets in a limited time is not guaranteed by bracket fire in mobile combat. Especially in the attack on the move, or after the final artillery strike as well. The most effective fire results from the complete processing of data from targets already fired upon, the first ranging shot, the utilization of a range-finder, etc. These methods received constant attention during exercises training commanders.

A creative approach to training, constant supervision over the training of young officers, and well-organized competition among them lead to the training of skillful and resolute artillery commanders. For example, Capt N. Shamilyuk became the regiment's best battery commander during his second year in command. Three young officers from the battalion commanded by Lt Col V. Piatkovskiy were winners in the district competition of fire and fire command and control. The battalion commander himself won a competition which the magazine VOYENNY VESTNIK had organized.

Young officers mature quickly and acquire professional expertise in those units where Lt Col Ye. Kuleshov and Capt S. Baygush are responsible for the training of commanders.

Young officers need not be indulged for the weaknesses, of course. They will grow more quickly if people will deal with them according to the demands of modern combat without excusing them for their youth.

12247

CSO: 1801/2

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR INCREASING PILOTS' TECHNICAL SKILLS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 84 p 1

[Lead editorial: Pilot's Engineering Training]

[Text] The quality of fulfillment of military training tasks, tactical and firing skill, and effective use of the military capabilities of aviation systems, and therefore also the achievement of victory in battle, are unthinkable without the possession of firm professional skills by military pilots and their high state of engineering training. Engineering knowledge permits them to understand more deeply the nature of the processes taking place in the systems, assemblies and sub-assemblies of the aircraft, to maximize its tactical and technical capabilities, and to react keenly to the slightest deviations in the operation of the equipment. Concern for the engineering training of pilots has an ever more important place in the activity of commanders, political organs and staffs.

For example, in the unit where Major V. Komissarov is deputy commander for aviation engineering services, most serious attention is paid to forming in pilots a high degree of technical competence, and to training them in a spirit of care toward their combat aircraft. Here socialist competition for thorough study and excellent maintenance of aviation systems and economizing of their resources is very effective. The regiment's material training base has well equipped classrooms, laboratories and simulators. The aerial fighting men learn to combine with maximum effectiveness the technical and tactical capabilities of the aircraft. Pilots' engineering training has an operational thrust; i.e., it studies most completely and in greatest detail the type of aircraft found in the unit, and practices accurately determining the causes of the slightest deviations in the functioning of any of its subassemblies, assemblies or systems.

Firm engineering knowledge helped the crew consisting of Major A. Zolotov and lieutenant V. Kuklev after their aircraft collided with a bird quickly to determine the damage, make the correct decision and safely land the aircraft. Lt Col G. Kuzyashev, Major G. Zaginaylov, Captain G. Tokarev and other pilots have demonstrated technically competent actions in difficult tactical situations.

Heightened responsibility for their own learning and deep interest in engineering training are characteristic of pilots. Yet one sees instances of

inadequate knowledge of the rules governing the operation of aviation equipment and unsure actions when minor changes in its operation are encountered. This can have serious consequences. Thus, while Captain L. Kelle was flying he incorrectly and by guess-work established the wing sweepback angle, and as a result exceeded permissible speed and committed an act likely to cause a flight accident.

Such instances not only indicate reduced responsibility of some pilots for individual engineering training. They bespeak of a low methodological level of flight personnel training and a lack of purposeful cockpit training before accomplishing missions. Sometimes aviation engineering service commanders and specialists stay aloof from training of pilots on the operation of aviation equipment. This is intolerable.

It is necessary to make a principled, party assessment of formalism in this area. And it does still exist. Thus, in some Pacific Fleet aviation units, during the flight examination period pilots were allowed to do numerous other things in the air, as a result of which examinations lacked necessary strictness. Some flight crews simply did not take part in technical training, but were given high marks for knowledge in this area. This caused complacency and indifference and reduced the military training indices.

It is necessary to improve constantly the quality of checks on the ability of flight personnel to operate aviation equipment. This must not be done in a general and an overall way, but must isolate engineering knowledge and skills necessary to accomplish successfully specific tactical techniques, use weapons effectively, and ensure unconditional flight safety. It is important to check carefully the engineering knowledge and skills of aerial fighting men after interruptions in their flying and when they enter the unit, and to react without fail to any shortcomings and errors, determine methods and time periods required to eliminate them, and only thereafter permit them to fly alone. In seeking to bring young officers on line quickly, one must not force matters to the detriment of their firm mastery of the theory and practice of operating aviation equipment.

Engineering knowledge of pilots is of tremendous importance in solving a most important state task-- that of ensuring flight safety. With the help of such knowledge the aerial fighting man is in a position to notice and analyze the slightest deviation in the functioning of his equipment, and promptly warn aviation engineering service specialists, thus permitting the defect to be eliminated quickly and guaranteeing the system reliability. If this knowledge is lacking the pilot may not pay attention to a deviation. This is fraught with the possibility for interruption of a flying mission, premature breakdowns and wearing out of equipment, overexpenditure of fuel and other undesirable consequences.

The central place in the organization of engineering training belongs to the deputy commander for aviation engineering services. To a large measure success depends on his competence, organizational abilities, persistence and high principles. It is important to study carefully and modify the topics for independent work by officers and the training simulator lists, ensure maximum

value is obtained from each lesson and simulator, and keep track to see that all pilots, without exception, take part in this training.

Daily party-political work must focus pilots on improving their engineering training. Commanders, political organs and party organizations are called upon to inculcate in aerial fighting men a responsible, proprietary attitude toward the equipment entrusted to them, and more actively involve them in creative and research work. We must not reconcile ourselves to instances when pilots are passive toward participation in work on inventions and innovations, and stand aloof from technical groups, quizzes and other measures aimed at raising engineering erudition. The personal example of pilot-communists is to play an important mobilizing role here. It is necessary to use more effectively socialist competition and advanced experience acquired during the course of studies, in the interests of engineering training.

To improve constantly the quality of pilots' engineering training means to ensure the reliable mastery of modern aviation equipment, to multiply successes in military training, and to improve the combat readiness of the Air Force.

9069

CSO: 1801/17

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

BETTER ADHERENCE TO TRAINING SCHEDULE CALLED FOR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Missile Crew Coordination"]

[Text] The training year in the army and navy has entered its final phase. These days, each day and each hour is especially precious. The soldiers are using training time with maximum effectiveness. At tactical exercises and training sessions and during field firings and missile launches they are learning to act with initiative, decisively, full of confidence and are struggling persistently for successful fulfillment of the training plans and schedules and socialist commitments.

The missilemen are moving in step with the soldiers of all arms and services toward the planned gains. Sharpening the skills of handling modern missile complexes, they give special attention to missile crew coordination as one of the important elements of combat readiness.

Coordination is acquired in the process of intensive combat training. It comes to those crews whose personnel have thoroughly learned the equipment and weapons entrusted to them, confidently operate them in the most complex situation conditions, interact closely in all stages of mission accomplishment and, when necessary, ensure full-fledged interchangeability at their combat positions. For total coordination, it is necessary for each specialist not only to perform his functional duties efficiently and skillfully, but also to know the mission of the crew and the subunit (podrazeleniye) and to understand how the crew must operate to carry it out successfully.

The commander of the crew is its central figure. He must train the crew methodically, competently and systematically, taking into account the functional duties and individual capabilities of each specialist. Much depends on his personal professional skills, methods and ways of operating which he possesses and knowledge of the fundamentals of military pedagogy and psychology. Experience of tactical exercises and field firings show: the higher the commander's level of methodical and special training and the higher his prestige with subordinates, the higher the coordination of the combat crew he commands and the more complete the realization of the fire capabilities of the missile complex.

A higher school of professional training of personnel and coordination of missile crews is the combat training missile launches. At the concluding phase of working out combat training missions, a situation should be created in which the missilemen could operate with maximum intensity and learn to search for new, more effective ways to employ weapons and to coordinate their actions in time, lines and targets. At the exercises just past, precisely such coordination was demonstrated by the crews commanded by Lieutenant E. Matveyev and Senior Lieutenant N. Vishnevskiy. Conditions were created in the course of the training in which it was impossible to complete the set tasks without a high degree of teamwork and without the coordinated and almost automatic actions of each soldier and of the crew as a whole. Good training enabled the specialists to pass the test with flying colors. In the most difficult situations, the commanders demonstrated a personal example in handling equipment and the ability to control the crews.

Senior commanders, staff officers, engineers and technicians are called upon to give constant attention to the training of missile crews. An analysis of the work of leading military collectives and their experience in mastering new equipment in brief time periods shows that successful crew teamwork is achieved primarily where all officials operate in concert, according to one plan and creatively; approach with a high exactingness the professional selection of future specialists from the number of young replacements who arrive; and continually study the political, business-like and moral qualities of the soldiers. This makes it possible to see the "weak" points in the training of specialists and to eliminate in a timely manner the shortcomings identified, to plan the execution of exercises and tasks taking into account the specific knowledge and skills of the soldiers and to define clearly the individual goals for improving their professional skills.

There is no permanent solution to coordinating combat crews. Experienced specialists go into the reserves and new recruits take their place. Therefore, the work of polishing the skills of the crew numbers, "grinding" them and training adequate replacements for the masters requires continuous and coordinated efforts directed at bringing those lagging behind up to the level of the front-ranking ones and at ensuring continuity of the best traditions and the most effective methods of working with the equipment.

Much experience in this respect has been amassed in antiaircraft missile unit "X". Here, the practice of phased planning of the growth of skills of the combat crew numbers has proved to work well. For example, in the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Stavro, after the specialists acquire firm operating skills under conditions of targets maneuvering and "enemy" jamming, they turn to working out complex tasks. In doing so, they simultaneously complete tasks on tactical, technical and fire training. Each of these lessons and training session is a new stage in the growth of the soldiers' combat skills.

Unfortunately, sometimes systematic and consistent work on training the crews is replaced by coaching and rush work. This is especially common in the concluding stage of the training period. However, deficiencies in knowledge and skills reveal themselves sooner or later. This is what happened, for

example, in the antiaircraft missile battalion commanded by Major V. Burdin. At the end of the winter training period the missilemen missed several lessons on special preparation and some of them were conducted in a simplified situation. Prior to the spring testing, they stepped up their training: they covered several topics in one lesson. Although they managed to avoid getting a low evaluation, in the summer training period they are showing poor coordination in their operational efficiency.

The role of socialist competition in the struggle for high crew coordination is exceptionally great, with its competitiveness, the high momentum of the struggle for first place and the soldiers' mutual gain. It is important that the commanders maintain a spirit of rivalry, fully use the mobilizing and educational role of competition and publicize the accomplishments of the winners.

Questions of missile crew coordination must also occupy an important place in the work of political workers and party and Komsomol organizations. The work should be directed at strengthening soldiers' friendship, comradeship, mutual assistance and collectivism and cultivate in them a consciousness of high personal responsibility for fulfilling their functional duties.

To carry out the training schedules with honor and to achieve high crew coordination is to make an important contribution to increasing the combat readiness of the subunits and units.

12567

CSO: 1801/021

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

OUTSTANDING PILOT PROFILED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 84 p 1

[Article by Major S. Levitskiy, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Guards' Style"]

[Text] This happened at night over the burning hot desert range. The fighter, piloted by military pilot first-rate Guards Major P. Serov, was swiftly heading to intercept a radio-controlled target. The command post was giving target data irregularly; apparently, the "enemy" was emitting strong electronic jamming. But the distance to the target was growing inexorably shorter. This is about where the line of attack had to be.

Then, straight ahead of the fighter, the afterburner flame from the target drone suddenly blazed up like a gas-stove burner. Serov had the desire to turn away to avoid running into it, but he suppressed it. "Reduce speed," he began the combat calculations. The air brakes were extended. The engine's rpm's were reduced to the minimum. The missile could be launched. The increased flame of the "burner" ahead quivered and went out in the blue-black emptiness of the night sky. A hit! But almost simultaneously with opening fire, Serov felt the aircraft's engine stop.

The aircraft began to lose altitude. The Guards major efficiently performed the operations for starting the engine.

It started! A slight acceleration and he headed for the airfield.

Here is what happened. Severely testing the pilots of the Guards fighter aircraft regiment, the senior officer ordered that the target execute a sudden and complicated maneuver. The plan of the air battle was that Serov's aircraft would probably "rush by" the target in this situation. Everything, very likely, had been taken into account. But the high combat characteristics of the aircraft, the resourcefulness of the fighter pilot, his coolness and skills decided the outcome of the battle in favor of the first-rate pilot.

Of course, the engine stopping in the air is an exceptional case by itself. There was also doubt as to whether the pilot acted correctly. For that reason, Serov's aerial battle was thoroughly analyzed on the ground. The conclusion was unanimous--he had acted correctly, as if at the front.

Having found out about this, Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel (Retired) A. Kislyakov, a veteran of the Guards air regiment who was visiting his old regiment, said:

"In a combat situation, we also squeezed everything we could out of the aircraft and studied initiative and calculation. It is good that pilots of today's generation are using our experience."

I met with Guards Major Serov at the height of the flying. The thunder of the jet-engine whine rolled above the birch expanse. Serov was not flying that day and was already on leave. But he could not help but glance toward the airfield, even though he had enough concerns at home. He had to get ready to travel; they all would go back to his native lands, to the Volga. His family was not small--three little daughters, two of them twins. By the way, once some friends recorded their voices on tape. Serov heard the "surprise" in the burning sands of the training grounds: "Honestly, tears came to his eyes."

Pavel Ivanovich told me a little about himself. He attended school at the Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and Navigators imeni marshal aviatsii V. A. Sudets. He then served in various places. He flew on Sakhalin, over the Volga and near Moscow. He always tries to align himself with the feats of the front-line guardsmen. He flies an aircraft named after Kislyakov and the symbol "Guards" is drawn on the fighter's fuselage. Really, isn't this sort of thing commitment?

I heard a lot of good things about Guards Major Serov here, the best pilot of the regiment (a great honor). As a communist and deputy squadron commander, his first concern is people and training subordinates to be the same masters of aerial combat, persistent and responsive as he himself strives to be. "He's one of us, Guard's style!" is what the veteran had to say about him.

For courage and skill demonstrated at the range, Guards Major Serov has been rewarded with a watch inscribed with his name.

12307

0501 10/1/20

NAVAL FORCES

CORRESPONDENT REPORTS FROM SOVIET WARSHIPS IN MEDITERRANEAN

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Sep 84 p 11

[Article by special LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Aleksandr Prokhanov in the Mediterranean Sea, August-September 1984: "The Squadron"]

[Text] The gray steel wall of the signaller's bridge has a very fine film of salt. It is like an antique fresco in the drizzling rain: under the rime are mottled nimbuses and images, outlines of trees and temples. But these are not images and nimbuses, but the colors of the identification markings of "Phantoms", "Mirages" and "Tornadoes". Outlines of destroyers and frigates. The heraldry of foreign 'machines' are a help to the signaller. It is a 20th century fresco.

The ship is in neutral waters. A city lies invisible beyond the green haze. The signaller, waiting for an unknown target, pressed the heavy binoculars to his eyes and reports:

"Surface target off the port side!"

The warship appears out of the fog. It emerges as a threatening long form of superstructures and turrets. It is the American destroyer Brisco. It is rushing to look us over, probing with its radar beams.

I look at the foreign destroyer through the telescope. A helicopter is lifting off from the stern. It approaches above the flood of blue. It trembles and pulsates. It swells in the sky-blue eyepieces. It rushes toward us, shining brightly and glimmering, showing white with the bomb and missile slings. It is a predatory Sea Sprite...

The signaller, looking through his binoculars, stretches to meet the helicopter and puts his chest to the sights. The space between the young weather-beaten face and the cabin compresses and trembles. It is the first time this young sailor of ours has seen an American helicopter so close. He is nervous. I sense this when I hear his tense, sharp voice:

"Airborne target moving along port side!"

"The Mediterranean Sea, so to speak, is NATO's 'rear' water area," Rear Admiral Valentin Yegorovich Selivanov, commander of the Soviet squadron,

emphasized in a conversation with me. "It is a sea base of the NATO naval structure. The strategists of Washington, London and their allies have turned it, this sea, into a launching area for a strike against the USSR. With the appearance of ships bearing red stars in the Mediterranean Sea the aggressors no longer feel unpunished and understand that they will certainly be stopped and that retribution hangs over each of their launched aircraft and over each of their nuclear submarines. This is why the Soviet sailors stand watch in the name of peace day and night here in the Mediterranean Sea."

Selivanov is of those who remembers the appearance of our navy here. The enemy's shock. The mighty radiance of the Soviet naval flag in the NATO "sanctum" and at shores where before the stems of their ships went in with boundless impudence.

He remembers how the roaring pairs of foreign deck aircraft swept over the very masts, simulating a strike and attack--and our sailors, under the whips lashing from the sky, turned the gunsights and followed them. He remembers how an enemy aircraft carrier, a riveted metallic island shielding the sun, suddenly changed course and took a direct course toward the ship, threatening to crush it under its cliff-like sides. It threatened and forced it not simply out of the area, but out of the Mediterranean Sea itself, back to the Soviet shores where, they say, these ships which appeared near Corsica belong. But he, the commander, held course, the course of the ship with the Soviet flag, steaming in the blue Mediterranean waters.

Or there is a fog and it is pitch-dark. A helicopter soared up from a foreign frigate and at low altitude, hidden from sight, approached the ship. Its marker on the radar screen was like that of an approaching surface target. It was directly ahead, coming head-on. Just a little more and we could have been rammed: a collision, the crunch of steel bulkheads, a hole in the side, falling of towers and masts.... The commander sounds the action stations. The heart pounds. There is fatigue.... Another provocation....

All of this happened, but the Soviet fleet did not leave. It humbled the arrogance of the NATO ships. It forced them to reckon with it. In the form of the Soviet squadron, the imperialists encountered an equal deterring force. Here in the Mediterranean Sea, we now observe a fragment of global opposition.

The admiral calmly and prosaically talks about the aspects of this opposition.

"Upkeep of the fleet without bases!" The entire southern coastline of the highly developed capitalist countries is at the service of the American Sixth Fleet operating in the water area. The convenient ports of Barcelona, Toulon, Naples, Izmir.... Industrialized bases and piers. An unlimited supply of water and fuel. Coastal plants and docks which perform the most complex repair. Major cities where a crew can come to recuperate, release their psychological tension amidst the entertainment and sights and meet with families who have flown in from the States.... The American Sixth Fleet has all of this.

But our Soviet squadron is always at sea! Tankers with fuel sail from the Union, floating workshops and refrigerator ships with meat carcasses in the

refrigerators arrive. Any repair is done on the water. We frequently buy fresh water. If there is a storm, don't count on a quiet harbor. You quickly weigh anchor so the chain does not break, ride the storm and pitch, rise and fall amidst the deep; whether you are an antisubmarine cruiser with aircraft on board or a landing ship with marine infantry--it doesn't matter. It is like this for weeks. You are without land and green grass, without the city noise, without friends and loved ones....

Only a powerful, technically equipped country is able to maintain such a fleet. A tanker fleet. Floating plants. All-purpose supply ships. Hospital ships equipped with the latest equipment. Set up lines of communications. Communications. A mobile settlement carried out on the vast expanses of water....

Like a peasant can guess the weather by signs--the flight of birds, the color of the sunset, the falling of the dew--so does he, the commander see by the behavior of the aircraft carriers the imminence of a crisis, the next conflict shaking the Middle East. Every time the tanks of the Israeli aggressors broke through the borders of Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, American aircraft carriers began to gather and slowly move from the direction of Sicily. They filled the sky with the howling of their squadrons.

The aircraft carrier is a policy carried out with the help of bombing instruments. And now at the morning reports, our flag intelligence officer guides his pointer over the map and shows the latest route of the Saratoga, its turning around at Corsica and Sicily and readiness to rush eastward.

The admiral goes on, and I am looking at him, and he never stops thinking. Where does this lean, very calm man, who spends many months every year aboard ship get his strength? In the recollections about his native Yelets, where the streets smell of wheat fields, or about the Baltic where he served? Or maybe in the recollections about his wife, or about his son who is now sailing somewhere on his own dry-cargo ship?

It is difficult for a seaman far away from home. But he does not seek sympathy. He does not seek tranquility. Service is service!

I look at the gray smoke of the distant Lebanese shore. At first as a green hachure on the radar screen and then materializing in the lenses of the sight, a heavy floating structure resembling an iceberg emerges from this smoke. It is an American helicopter carrier, the Ponce de Leon LSA (landing ship assault). It is a slow steel mountain whose bowels hold marines, compartments with landing craft and hangars with helicopters.

I observe the operation of the Ponce de Leon through the binoculars. Here two more Sea Knight helicopters, flying boxcars with two rotors, slowly departed the carrier. They hovered over the sea, rose and moved in an arc, catching our ship in its roaring oval as well, and turned back toward Lebanon. The eyes try to make out the fading dots through the lenses, but when they disappear I follow their blips on the radar.

The round field of the screen is dark. In a circular direction the scanning beam "lights up" the outline of the shoreline and the sharp-nosed extremity, the cape to where, the two targets, the two Sea Knight helicopters, are relocating.

Our aircraft take off. They are long and thick-backed with buzzing whirls and with plastic bubbles in the belly. They have red stars above the masts, leaving transparent soot. They are two antisubmarine aircraft. They soon fly away into the salty mist to the search sector to work on a training mission with a submarine.

Their "hunt" is similar to a wolf hunt. The aircraft drop buoys into the sea, a long barrier of floats like red flags on a hunt. Each buoy is a small underwater ear listening to the sea and for the operation of a submarine. The buoy hears the signal and sends the signal to the skies, to an aircraft. "Such-and-such buoy! Such-and-such sector! Here is a submarine!"

We, the ships, are above the water. But below, a diesel submarine is working as the enemy and training is going on. We are operating not unlike beaters. We drive the target to the buoys, to the flags. There is a contact! The sub has run up against a buoy! Somewhere in the sky, in an aircraft cabin the indicator of the buoy number began blinking. The information was received from the sky on board the ships--the bearing and range of the target. The turbines roared and the ships lunged forward. We tighten the ring. The ship's sonarmen lower devices into the water--streamlined underwater capsules which follow the vessel. They emit ultrasonic pulses and receive the echoes. They search for the submarine among the underwater currents. There is a contact! Here it is, in the blue splashing triangle over the crests of which the swift gray ships are moving. The chase, the fight, the trackdown!

The commander of the escort ship Druzhnyy is Gennadiy Antonovich Radzevskiy. Here, when running, he is constantly on the move. To the navigator, to the operations room, to the telescope, to the radio station, to the signal bridge. These small trajectories of the commander are more or less repeated on the dark blue map board of the sea by the ships which approach, move away and intersect one another's courses. First you see their stern, then their side....

If one is to say in general terms what being the commander of a ship of such a rank and class as the Druzhnyy means, you can unmistakably affirm that it is work! Tremendous work day and night, with not pauses, breaks or end; work for days, weeks, months....

Perhaps of all the professions I have had the opportunity to observe, that of the commander of a modern warship is to me the most complex and laborious. Society has placed a tremendous responsibility on him. He has hundreds of jobs.

He is a born seafarer. Mooring two ships bobbing on the water, seeing that they do not hit and crush the side. Navigating in straits and narrows in the middle of shoals, fog, oncoming vessels--by sailing directions, by radar and on some astonishing intuition given from above. Broadside refueling on the

open sea with the warship and tanker going at high speed and on a parallel course with fuel, machine oil and fresh water flowing into the inside of the ship. The sea is stormy and in the distance, like an oblique shadow, comes a foreign aircraft carrier. Or that terrible Atlantic cyclone when the vessel overturned on its side, turned and twisted, and one could hear how the steel moaned furiously and the exposed propellers slashed the air; it seemed that one more degree of incline and the steel superstructures would start falling. Then he, the commander, brought the ship out of the storm, hid it behind a small island and when operating the turbines stayed under the protection of the reliable cliffs....

He is an expert of the extremely complex engineering battle, where the knowledge of hundreds of large and small weapons systems of his own and of the enemy is literal knowledge, with tactical and technical capabilities and manuals pertaining to the use of torpedoes and missiles, depth charges and sonar complexes, radars and means of combatting underwater saboteurs. We are speaking about a tremendous amount of factual knowledge constantly present in consciousness which is necessary for a modern fast battle when there is no time to take a reference book off the shelf. It is an element of namely such a person, with a multitude of impromptus of "battle" I observe now, being present on the navigation.

He is a diplomat. The ship is a part of our country's territory. This territory travels the open sea, encountering enemies, friends and neutrals. Each call at a foreign port is a delicate diplomatic action with direct and indirect consequences. And the commander's word, even if a toast or a joke, is carefully weighed and filtered by the port hosts invited on board. During encounters with foreign weapons, often nuclear, the commander takes every measure so that they remain peaceful, that any provocation is ruled out and that the weapons remain "holstered".

Finally, he is a sociologist. The combat collective, pyramidally ascending to him, is a small part of our society represented by various categories of people. The commander, taking into account the contradictions, complexities, personal attitudes, ambitions and passions, forms this collective into a flexible and guided system of relations, workers and combat bonds.

Commanding a ship is an uninterrupted "flow". Dozens of radiograms come in and go out in a day. Neapolitan watermelons are purchased. A quarrel between two young lieutenants is settled. A sailor's birthday is observed. Late at night the door to the commander's cabin remains open and he is "running on" about something to the executive officer, listening to something from the deputy commander for political affairs....

It is a gloomy iron plateau edged with white foam. Rotary winged aircraft with lobes lowered. Here it is, the "American"--the general-purpose landing ship Nassau, the real symbol of the latest U.S. incursion into the Middle East. There are 2,000 marines on board, the same ones who arranged the massacres on the streets of Beirut and shot at the young Palestinians. Sea Stallion heavy assault helicopters. Nimble and swift Sea Cobras--fire support helicopters, forerunners of the assault landing.... A war is carefully packaged and stored in this huge metallic box. The Nassau is a "local war"

container. An impulse of the White House's command, and this brutal box opens instantly, the seeds of invasion fly out and germinate with blood and death.

Being in the vicinity of the war machine tested near Beirut provokes an understandable reaction in our crew. Vigilance and again vigilance!

"Target number 12! Bearing.... Range...."

The radar operator at the scope tracks the targets. In the greenish reflections is his forehead. He has headsets on and the microphone to his lips. The green marks fly through his pupils and consciousness and each leaves its track. The radar plotters plot the targets on the tracing cloth. They hold the aircraft in the weightless traps of the pencil lines. They entangle them and do not let them get away without a trace--they find out....

Radar operator Sergey Kovsharov is from a family of workers from the city of Zhdanov from the Azovstal' Plant. Prior to joining the service, he worked at an open-hearth amidst molten metal. Perhaps the side of the ship was cast from that steel which came from his plant.

He went off to serve along with his bosom friend Aleksandr Shamanovich. He went to the Baltic and his friend to Afghanistan. He celebrated his birthday in the Bay of Biscay during a storm. It pitched terribly and made him feel sick. Comrades who were accustomed to the pitching relieved him from the watch and let him rest in bed. The deputy commander for political affairs played a cassette with his mother's voice recorded on it. Gradually he became a sailor and got accustomed to the ship.

The sailor "directs" the targets on the scope and classifies them distinguishing the peaceful airliners from the supersonic Phantoms. Contact with a NATO combat aircraft rouses in him the lightning fast desire to direct it away from the ship, to screen the vessel with itself and to inform the commander about the possible danger for our formidable ship so as to instantaneously to bristle with its antiaircraft complexes and to set up a curtain against a possible enemy attack with fire and steel.

His grandfather was killed in the war. His father and mother had lived a peaceful and friendly life. Now he, the grandson of a grandfather who had been killed, was once again in the danger zone, in that zone from which the "humorous" threats about bombing the USSR in 5 minutes resound. He believes in his country, in his people, in his star and in his happiness. He believes that he will return home and celebrate his wedding.

Daybreak. The distant rose-colored shore. An island, fishing boats anchored in the roadstead. Near by the "escort ship" a submarine surfaces, rose colored in the dawn. The conning tower is like a glass cutter.

The entry in the watch log:

"0312 hours. Multiple target noises detected in bearing sector 17-25. Contact is being classified.

0331 hours. Target number 1 at bearing 25. Target number 2 at bearing 29. Target number 3 at bearing 33. Target number 4 at bearing 36. Target number 5 at bearing 40.

0335 hours. Aircraft carrier at bearing 38, range 75 cables...."

We go below. The control center. Steel cables stretch along the plating, wind, branch out, entwine our ship and come to an end with the glass of the instruments and the plastic of the consoles. Red and blue valves. Circles of dials. Eye-sockets of the screens. Keyboards and buttons. The entire space is in the nerve centers of control. There is an even, all-absorbing hum. But if you listen closely, you can hear in it a number of complex sounds. Crackles, bells, howls and the membranous movement of voices. The bluish heads of the sailors, shaven close to the skin, join the race of beams and the oscillations of the pointers. We trim by the stern and the floor moves under your feet. The submarine is submerging. A butterfly flew in when the hatch was being battened down. It flutters about and goes to the depths of the sea with us.

The captain of the diesel submarine, Georgiy Sergeyevich Bondarenko, told me many interesting things.

They set out for the Mediterranean Sea with a tanker. They were navigating over the familiar path on the surface and well-trodden tracks. Everywhere the NATO ships followed the submarines; NATO aircraft flew, photographed and communicated to one another.... They broke off from the antisubmariners, transforming into the gleam of the waves, into the noise of a fish fin, into emptiness.

Unlike a nuclear submarine, the diesel submarine cannot stay submerged for a long time. The maximum is several days, as long as there is energy in the electrical storage batteries. As soon as they run down, the submarine surfaces, turns on its diesel engines which produce electrical energy by burning fuel and recharge the storage batteries. And once again it submerges. The fuel for the diesels is also limited. When it starts to run out, the submarine heads for a "point" where it waits for a tanker.

During surfacing and approaches to the tanker it is easier for the enemy to get a fix on and get a jump on the submarine. It requires a lot of skill on the part of the commander to surface inconspicuously and to break away should he come under enemy radars and hydrophones--nevertheless get away and break off.

Here is a case in point. We approached the tanker to take on fuel. An Orion reconnaissance aircraft arrived and vectored its search ships to our submarine. Two American ASW ships approached, stood at some distance and covered the submarine, "sweeping" the sea with their sonars and, as soon as the submarine submerges, intending to take it in its pincers, drive it away and "track" it like rabbits are tracked in the autumn fields.

How to get away? How to deceive the enemy? The commander conferred with his assistants. He talked it over with the tanker captain. They worked up a

simple, seemingly primitive plan. And it worked. The submarine submerged and calmly and noiselessly headed north.

Only after many weeks, having met once again with the tanker (the crew rejoiced: "Our submarine has arrived!" The women cooks treated the sailors with dumplings: "You are our sons!"), did the commander hear the rest of the story. For a whole hour the Americans did not notice the dirty trick. Then they sensed that something was wrong, became uneasy and started signalling one another. One even ran right up to the tanker, turned on its searchlight, illuminated the side and saw instead of the submarine.... They understood that we had fooled them and started to circle and search. The tanker weighed anchor and started to move away. The Americans followed. They think the submarine is navigating under the keel in the noise shadow of the tanker. The Orions arrive. They tried everything! And it was all in vain!

You cannot tell everything. Not because it involves military secrets, you simply do not want to burden your friends and close ones with this harsh, unsettling information. You do not want to see the frightened eyes of your wife or the paled faces of comrades who are unable and sometime do not desire to understand the menacing military reality, the confrontation threatening catastrophe. The ethics of today's military men are such that still they keep to themselves and stop experience negative for the psyche of man. Let people work, let them enjoy themselves and let them rest. In this approach it is all the same: restrain the onslaught of the total cruel forces threatening peace and tranquility on Earth.

12567

CSO: 1801/20

NAVAL FORCES

PERFORMANCE LEVELS TIED TO CREW INDIFFERENCE

Ship's High Rating Lost

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Shirokov, Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet: "Was the Ship Really Excellent"]

[Text] The crew of the small subchaser commanded by Captain 3rd Rank V. Lebedev is often referred to during the review of the results of socialist competition, at meetings and at service conferences and in their unit where they talk about those lagging behind and whose deficiencies in combat training and in service arouses well-founded anxiety in the command. And a year ago they often talked about this crew. Only then they urged people to emulate it and to assimilate the best things, which they felt were numerous. And what doubts could there be? At that time the ship had won the rank of outstanding for 4 years in a row.

I met Captain 2nd Rank Lebedev at what was a difficult time for him. His crew had just returned from a cruise during which the ship completed its air defense firing and the results were already known at headquarters. The low grade in the weapons exercise again confirmed that things were not going well with the crew. But contrary to what I expected, the commander did not appear too annoyed. It appeared that Lebedev was busy explaining the reasons for this so that together with his subordinates he could energetically start to eliminate the deficiencies displayed. Apart from anything else, pride must be instilled in the sailors who not long ago had been among the best. But what I suddenly heard from the captain 3rd rank was surprising.

"It was certainly annoying. However, on the whole things aren't too bad. We weren't first, but we weren't last. And to be a leader, and I know this from experience, you must be honorable and fussy. Yet let any interruption occur and the reproaches immediately begin: you are one of the best, people compare themselves to you..."

And then I had the idea that perhaps the original reason for the submariners' present unenviable reputation was in these words.

Once people came here for advanced experience. The competition among subunits here was especially sharp and no ship in the division had more masters of military affairs. And Captain 3rd Rank Lebedev in his day had this high qualification. He was deeply and skillfully involved in managing socialist competition, special training for sailors and striving to keep the crew among the best. His praiseworthy zeal was recognized and valued.

Then division headquarters closed its eyes to an interruption that occurred while they were completing a combat training mission, an interruption that had seemed all the more annoying since it was not too noticeable and was the first after a sequence of impressive achievements. Moreover, at first headquarters had given the exercise an excellent evaluation. Perhaps they supposed that it was possible for the commander to take this evaluation as an advance and value it correspondingly, but most of all they did not want to spoil the total picture with an accidental stroke.

But for the division this event did not stay unnoticed. Those competing with Lebedev's crew were surprised by such an attitude from headquarters. How could they talk about any honest rivalry? And this injustice affected not only the rivals but the leading sailors as well. It became uncomfortable to look comrades in the eye. And whereas earlier the role of excellent had inspired Lebedev and awakened a thirst for active work in him, now it became a burden. He lessened his demands on his subordinates and took as his due the easy times which he had once received from the command. Subordinates soon caught the commander's mood. Now even in those instances when Lebedev felt the desire to do everything as he knew he should, he didn't get the earlier support he had gotten used to. At times this still bothered him, but most of the time he calmed himself with the thought that nothing special was going on. Indeed, as before they were first and the reserves of former authority were enough. Thanks to the headquarters' indulgent attitude to the environment, as before Captain 3rd Rank Lebedev remained the best commander in the division, although in fact this hadn't been so for a long time. This dichotomy could not go on for long.

One day the small subchaser had to take part in training to find and destroy a submarine. There was little time remaining until departure when the chief of radio-technical services reported to Lebedev that one of the radio-acoustical sets was inoperable due to sonar operator errors.

He should have reported what had happened, but that would have meant publicizing what the crew already knew and what those around had only just guessed. Lebedev decided to remain silent. Perhaps he could carry it off.

He couldn't. The crew completed torpedo firing on the submarine with a low score. Captain 3rd Rank Lebedev had to appear at the unit party committee and the division commander gave him a severe punishment.

It was as if everyone had opened his eyes. In any case things on the ship were in a poor state. Some were not doing all their work and others forgot about competition. A short time later the MPK [small subchaser] was stripped of the rank of excellent. They still basically blame Lebedev for that.

forgetting that by virtue of their service responsibilities both the division commander and headquarters specialists have to know the objective state of affairs in every crew. And not just know, but take appropriate measures.

Gradually this history was somewhat forgotten. For a long time the MPK has settled down in the middle of the division and is adopting moderate socialist commitments. No one remembers its earlier achievements and worst of all, the crew itself has completely forgotten about them. The text of the colorfully formulated collective socialist commitments has not a hint of desire to regain the rank of excellent. Now there is only one master of military affairs on the MPK, Warrant Officer A. Khodunov. And what is the source of specialists with high ratings on this ship? Special training in the crew is poorly organized and there is no strict control over its completion nor over competition for increased personnel class qualifications in subunits. And headquarters specialists are indifferent to this.

Deputy commander for political affairs Senior Lieutenant A. Semchenko also does not know the former achievements of the crew's personnel. And he indifferently shrugged his shoulders at the question of why the crew was deprived of the honored rank. "I don't know. That happened before I was assigned here."

When I left the ship, the harbor was unusually quiet. The watch at the ladder followed me despondently with his eyes. It seemed that the unassuming middle that had become the lot for this once-best ship was looking at me through his eyes.

Infighting, Indifference Cost Rating

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Sep 84 p.2

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant M. Lukanin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Break In The Chain"]

[Text] The small escort ship Gromkiy went out on a torpedo run. Commander of the mine-torpedo section Senior Lieutenant S. Vel'chu gave his subordinates the latest orders on weapons preparation and didn't notice that they had allowed an error. Although completed, the torpedo firing was given a low mark.

Even earlier the gunners were unable to get a high grade in artillery firing. The crew had almost lost all hope of somehow correcting its position. At the end of the training year the ship seemed one of those lagging behind, yet the Gromkiy finished the winter training period on the rise, coming out second in the unit. Why at the moment they should have been solidifying and strengthening their successes has the collective begun to give up one place after another in spineless fashion? Is it because of disappointing accidents?

Outwardly, it would seem, that this was the case, especially if one took into consideration that the escort ship earlier had received high grades many times

for combat exercise completion. And all the same, although at first glance this seemed devoid of any logic, it had its own cause and effect connection. And as confirmation of the regularity of these not really high grades, the headquarters and political section are now holding so much proof that one must even against his will think, "What were they relying on in tracing the ship's preparation to complete the exercise?" Thus during the summer months people were concerned that exercises in specialty and crew training were not being conducted very well. People in the crew did not technically prepare the equipment well enough. In short there were some deficiencies. But they have begun talking about them only now. But what about earlier?

Ship commander Captain 2nd Rank N. Modestov says, "I had no special reason to be concerned".

Is it likely that the commander was ignorant of the real situation on the ship? Indeed, regardless of how calming the reports sounded, there are enough ways of getting an objective idea of all the processes going on in the crew and of making an impact on them in a timely manner.

But let's assume that the commander was unable to use the purely service channels to control the situation on the ship. There is still socialist competition which by its own nature demands that people specifically evaluate, compare and announce the results of the activity of individual soldiers and the whole crew. If it doesn't take on a superficial character, competition eliminates the appearance of incidental, overstated and unjust things, especially as people are seized by the rivalry among themselves and strive to maximize self-return in training and service. In this way they themselves are extremely interested in increasing the effectiveness of their own labor.

And the question that immediately comes up is was there competition on the ship? And what was the value of competition among the ships if an outstanding ship doesn't confirm its former high results? Let us look once more a little more attentively at the low results of the military training mission's completion.

For many, Senior Lieutenant S. Vel'chu's failure to complete his work was totally unexpected. First, he commanded a combat section and this is a duty that demands professional maturity and experience. Second, the officer was a master of military affairs and, as the saying goes, you expect more from such specialists. As it turned out, Vel'chu had replaced the commander of the torpedo section, a petty officer with long service, with an officer, Senior Lieutenant I. Zhevagin. What was the combat leader after with this change? Undoubtedly he wanted to attain success at any price. At a critical minute the usual communications and cooperation in the subunit's work were broken. Senior Lieutenant I. Zhevagin fulfilled the order of the combat section commander exactly and did not notice the error.

Now people in the unit disapprove of this action by the BCH-3 (mine and torpedo division) commander. But the moral side of this seems neglected. The officer disregarded the authority of one of his subordinates, his participation in competition and his obligations. Indeed, let the firing become more successful and the torpedo section commander and his subordinates

would complete their obligations, practically not taking part in the firing. And apparently this became a habit if it remained unnoticed.

A crew is strengthened by each sailor's training and competition is called upon to develop initiative and responsibility. Had the mine-torpedo section met these demands, no substitutions would have entered the commander's head at the decisive moment. But the fact is that he wasn't sure of some of his subordinates for many appeared on the outstanding and foremost list not as people who had attained this rank through strenuous, contested battle, where the real qualities of everyone are shown, but through general successes and the ship allowed this because of the lack of the senior chiefs' strict demand.

Even now people on the Gromkiy believe that technical errors were the real reason for the last low marks. No, the specific miscalculations are only a consequence of the situation which formed on the ship and of the moral climate in the crew.

After the artillery firing which preceded the torpedo run, the gunners and the specialists from the radio-technical division almost quarreled, heaping the blame on each other. Meanwhile the duties of each of the sides during competition were being clearly determined, but the Gromkiy does not always succeed in fixing responsibility in this issue. The problem is primarily the lack of agreement among subunit commanders who did not want to admit responsibility relative to each other. It is enough to show that if the socialist obligations of both subunits had had a point about guaranteeing reliable, joint work, the problem would have been resolved.

Naturally at this point one asks about the party organization's position. Did it know that instead of close interaction between the commanders of those subunits, there were some disagreements? Perhaps the party organization did not understand that and attached no significance to it. For example, here are the minutes from the party bureau meeting on the hearing of Captain 2nd Rank O. Savel'yev, the former commander of the rocket artillery combat section, and the state of affairs in the subunits. They were particularly interested in how he organized competition in the combat section and his answer was startling in its laconicism. "In accordance with the existing requirements." Period. No explanation, no questions.

The party bureau conversation with the commander of the radio technical department, Captain-Lieutenant A. Sadof'yev, went roughly along the same lines.

It was noteworthy that the hearings of officers Savel'yev and Sadof'yev took place when summer training was in full swing and when it would have been possible to do a lot if daily concern for the reality of the competition had been shown.

For example, Lieutenant N. Trofimov who participated in the artillery firing said in surprise, "How can we compete? Indeed, the missions of the subunits are basically incomparable."

Trofimov is a young officer and he perceives everything that happens on the ship as not open to doubt. And he judges the competition as it takes place on the ship. It is used to determine places among subunits at the end of each training period and that is all.

This is how formalism which senior commanders allow in the organization and in the conduct of competition becomes sincere conviction among young subordinates.

And the unit headquarters got used to formalism in competition on the Gromkiy. And this is certainly because of the state of affairs on the ship. Yes, the crew had a favorable situation for a long time and they were fortunate in their high grades. But even weighted grades developed through work are the results of past work and the future must promise even more demand and require even fuller mobilization of forces.

At the present time Captain 2nd Rank L. Turchaninov, Captain 3rd Rank V. Shipilov and other staff officers say that they are busy with other problems and the Gromkiy is of no concern. And really, why should one get excited if the headquarters gives direct work on the ship such an unwarranted little time, relying on the self-discipline and self-control of the outstanding ship. But the whole point is that the necessary self-control isn't there. Too little significance has been given to publicizing competition among the ships and they have no idea of the demands on Gromkiy commander Captain 2nd Rank Modestov or those of his rivals. Perhaps the results of individual training missions by the competing ships are known but what about an exchange of the experience in this case, about mutual aid or mutual control.

By the time I had the occasion to visit this ship, the crew of the Gromkiy had responded to the nuclear missile cruiser Kirov's appeal for all personnel in the Northern Fleet to meet the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory with lofty achievements in socialist competition so it was natural to ask the commander how competition was on the Gromkiy. But Captain 2nd Rank V. Modestov, his deputy and the ship's officers that I met didn't understand what I was asking for a while, then suddenly remembering, quickly gave back the necessary theme, as if it was not a very substantial matter at all. They had to quickly get on to something else.

It was surprising that it was necessary to support this appeal. No one raised doubts, but the question of what they must watch for didn't come up. And if this affects only the Gromkiy. It is not the only one in the unit that will finish the year with poor results and it is especially annoying that this is taking place in the fleet that gave the pioneer of socialist competition to all military sailors this training year. Gromkiy sailors often see the cruiser Kirov, as they say in the fleet, visually. The cruiser's silhouette is well-known to them, but the rich experience of Kirov's crew in socialist competition to the Gromkiy (and also for several other ships in this unit) remains, by all appearances, a secret hidden behind many seals. One of them is undoubtedly the conscience of the crew itself. And the others? And why is such a break in the general chain of those competing possible?

12511

CSO: 1801/022

NAVAL FORCES

POOR TRAINING, OFFICER PREPARATION CITED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank N. Shinkarenko and Senior Lieutenant N. Litkovets, Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet: "The Ocean Will Judge"]

[Text] The submarine had exited to the ocean and during the trip, from the first miles of the cruise, a rivalry for the best results of each cruise day spread among the combat shifts. Naturally each sailor wanted to distinguish himself during his cruise watch, by the results of firing and in military exercises. There were all the conditions for this on the ocean and the concept of vigilance became first and foremost real and completely concrete.

One day the power supply strain indicator swung over to indicate an excess. Petty Officer 2nd Class V. Grishin immediately made the necessary switch-over and reported the event to the control center. The designed work level was restored. This was but one incident on the watch. Anywhere on shore it would have been passed off as totally harmless. The petty officer noticed the deviation in time and understood how to act in the situation at hand. But the ship's commander knew the real value of prudence on a cruise and how difficult it is when the seeming monotony of watch takes the edge off of the attention of the man who is one-on-one with equipment. A trifling on shore can become a serious complication at sea and this is why the commander arranged to note Grishin's diligence in such a way that the event on watch had wide publicity among the crew and was instructive to everyone. Thus a "five", one of the first on the cruise, appeared opposite the petty officer's name under the day's results on the socialist competition scoreboard.

Running ahead, let's say that there were many of them, these marks of high merit, which noted the results of the sailor's military training on the cruise. In return, each of them corresponded strictly to the amount and quality of the submariners' expended time and reflected their real contribution to the support of the ship's combat readiness. Yet it would seem that even recently an excellent evaluation in the collective not was very widespread. Take the previous cruise for example. Upon returning from that cruise praise awaited the commander and the whole crew at the base. An account of socialist competition during which "five's" noticeably prevailed over other marks, was presented to HQ as evidence of their well-being.

There were few "three's's" and they were basically at the initial stage of the cruise. The commander and political worker explained this by the fact that sailors were initially adapting to new conditions and it was natural for them to make mistakes then. The staff grew interested and wanted to know where specifically they had made mistakes. And it turned out that the low marks at the beginning of the cruise hid violations which under military conditions could have been disastrous. For example, let the vessel expose itself to the "enemy" while exiting from base and it is senseless to continue the cruise. The beginning of a cruise is no less a responsible stage than the last, when the primary volume of missions are frequently completed. But this is still not sufficiently enough instilled in the conscious of sailors and this is why the initial mediocre evaluations did not concern the collective too much.

However the headquarters took a fundamental position. They recommended that the ship commander think about how to improve the effectiveness of socialist competition on the ship and to bring it closer to reality.

How often do we hear this appeal: improve, bring closer, make more effective. But how is this specifically expressed? On the ship they decided on primarily reorienting the crew's consciousness and increasing demands on them. It was easy to show that some of the outstanding people in the crew were not living up to their potential. What specifically made some sailors outstanding? What distinguished them? Was it reliability in their work? Aspirations for improvement? The ability to carry out their plans in training and service faster than others? Honestly speaking, at the party meeting before the last cruise the conversation turned to this and circumstances advanced several submariners to the rank of outstanding. In some subunits the number of outstanding rankings has been adjusted to the obligations adopted.

And it isn't that in the obligations the crew raised a plank too high and tried to overcome the heights by means not totally correct. In one case some combat unit commanders and service chiefs openly overstated their subordinates' evaluations. Combat readiness magazines of some units flutter with absolute prosperity and one gets the impression that for chief instructors the lower scale of evaluations has in general lost the right to exist. Officers were warned to throw out low marks because they might be held strictly responsible for them since the general indicators in competition would fall. And the result was that the evaluation did not reflect the actual level of personnel training which means that it did not serve as a signal to take the necessary measures to improve the training process.

This reminds us of an instructive story. A unit was ordered to prepare a ship for an extended cruise. As is done in such cases a commission was sent aboard to check the ship's condition and find out what the crew needed. Some things on the ship needed refurbishing and others needed to be filled out, but all this was totally correctable in the time remaining until the cruise. Then the unexpected showed up somewhere else. Because of their poor training several specialists could practically not be allowed to stand watch on their own. Specifically, Captain-Lieutenant V. Kaplichnyy was one of them. Why had the question of his service conformity not come up earlier? Because the ship commander had hidden his subordinate's deficiencies, seemingly defending regimental honor this way. If the necessity of setting off on an ocean cruise had not come up, Kaplichnyy probably would have continued to be known as a totally successful officer. Now he had to find a replacement quickly.

This is certainly a rare case, but it graphically shows where the non-objective evaluations of peoples' professional qualifications can lead. It is unquestionably not easy to be objective at times, especially when completing some missions where there are known conditions. However it is appropriate to ask if these conditions don't sometimes come up artificially as the consequence of oversimplifications in training and competition. For example, is it right to consider a sailor fully trained to battle for the life of a ship if he has not had the chance to operate in a training exercise in a flooded compartment and to close a real hole and not a simulated one? It was no accident that the secretary of the submarine's party organization, Captain 3rd Rank A. Burchakov, talked about this at a party meeting. It is difficult to change the psychology of people who are accustomed to competition formalism and they began the struggle to do this by developing difficult conditions for the development of missions and by increased evaluation objectivity.

Initially some people were put out on the next cruise. It turned out that compared to the previous cruise, conditions had not changed, but people soon began to feel how difficult it was to get not just an excellent mark, but even a good one. For example it was suggested that Lieutenant Yu. Botov repeatedly pass an examination on clerical work. He thought that the commander would not give a lot of significance to the fact that he had violated the order for handling documents one day. This hardly had any relationship to the direct completion of watch duties. He made a mark on the wrong graph and misfiled a paper. A trifle? No, at sea there are no trifles. This is the idea that the crew's communists are persistently instilling in peoples' consciousness.

Let there be fewer outstanding people than before. What is important is that each of them meets the highest demands. This is how the crew reasoned. It is impossible to close your eyes to the fact that for some of them the rank of outstanding that was attained let's say at the end of the training year would ward off all reproaches in the future. An excellent rating cannot be establish once and stand for all times. What seemed perfection yesterday is the norm today. New equipment comes in, there are changes in the ways of conducting military operations and the scope of missions expand. An evaluation must delicately respond to this and not lose its stimulating influence.

A whole week of the ocean cruise has passed and the socialist competition board still does not have a single "five". To tell the truth, this worried the commander then as earlier, and then calmed him since all hopes were not tied to "making up for lost time" towards the end of the cruise. Perhaps the highest mark has become unattainable for the majority of the sailors? Captain-Lieutenants V. Grigor'yev and S. Sklizkov dispelled any doubt on this point. While passing examinations on their knowledge of the ship's equipment they not only displayed strong professional competence but also introduced various efficiency proposals. Thus they showed the mental inquisitiveness and the ability to see prospects, qualities exceptionally valuable for ship's officers. The competition throughout the duration of the cruise urged people to such perfection and thanks to this the submariners successfully completed all the assigned missions and earnestly approached closer to their main goal, becoming firmly established in the rank of excellent.

12511

CSO: 1801/022

NAVAL FORCES

OUTSTANDING SUBMARINE COMMANDER PROFILED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Fedorov: "The Submarine Commander"]

[Text] The submarine commander, Captain 1st Rank V. Samson, looked at the clock. It was long after midnight. The compartments of the missile submarine conducting a search of "enemy" ships from below had grown guardedly quiet. Only the sonarman on watch, Warrant Officer Ye. Bol'shakov, periodically broke the silence of the control room with reports: "The horizon is clear."

The commander approached the navigator. They bent over the map and mentally tried to picture themselves in the position of the opposing detachment commander. What would he do in his place to avoid an encounter with a submarine? It was as if the map came to life and became three-dimensional. It represented the boundless expanse of the ocean; then the ship silhouettes popped up on it and somewhere among them was the primary target--the cruiser. But where, in fact, were they? While you are searching for them in one area, the ships could go to another. One could search "gropingly" forever.

"Navigator, we must be here in half an hour," Viktor Ivanovich Samson pointed to a place on the map with the pencil point. "Let's try to come in from the west."

The commander's decision seemed unexpected and not well-founded. In preparing for the search at the base, this variation was not called for. But the navigator knew from experience that their commander never does anything that has not been thoroughly thought out. It is quite a different matter that not everyone was able immediately to fathom his intention; he quite frequently acted unusually. The navigator was in no hurry to ask questions, which Captain 1st Rank Samson did not like, but began thinking, trying to delve into the commander's intentions. He quickly made some calculations. Yes, of course, risks are inevitable here. But are victories possible without risk? Their commander followed this rule unswervingly, being able in so doing to be wary to the maximum.

The submarine heaved around. The navigator corrected his previous plotting. Now they were heading to where the commander figured the "enemy" had to be.

If it turned out that he was not there, it would hardly make sense to continue the search.

The missile carrier continued to approach closer to the point indicated by the commander. The long-awaited distinctive noises came through in the sonarman's headsets, weakly at first and then increasingly more distinctly. They had made long-range contact with the surface vessels.

This was a great success, but at the same time was merely the first step toward seizing the initiative in the developing duel. The battle itself was ahead. The missile submarine had to negotiate a powerful antisubmarine set up by the "enemy" and not make a mistake in identifying the primary target, which the escort ships had carefully masked....

Sonarman, torpedomen, helmsmen, bilgemen--the entire crew was now working to their utmost to realize the commander's bold plan. Then the missile submarine turned on the attack course....

The commander, Captain 1st Rank V. Samson, has been doing this for a long time now. His attacks serve as a sort of standard in the unit of submariners. This is a genuine school of skills for young commanders. Still, he himself has become accustomed, with each trip to sea, as if to test himself again and again, to evaluate his own professional qualities according to the latest result. Samson's entire service as a communist is characterized by a visible pattern: whatever position he has held, whatever task he is given, he has continuously performed it with the highest marks.

If you add up all the time Viktor Ivanovich has spent under water on his ocean voyages, it would amount to years. The shore for him all this time has been bays protected by hills, the hollow planking of piers, fleet garrisons.... The slight melancholy of parting and the restrained but incomparable joy of meeting.... He never imagined a different destiny.

On the work table in the captain's cabin lie letters from those who had served under him at different times. The former subordinates send him holiday greetings, tell him about themselves and ask for advice. After all, he has behind him the experience of managing people in the most difficult situations of long cruises, experience which gives him the right to be an authority in everything and in any life situation, especially in those which require of a navyman self-giving, courage and fortitude. It is no accident that when he was yet senior assistant commander, officer V. Samson was awarded the highest decoration of the Motherland--the Order of Lenin.

Above all, he demands high professionalism from subordinates. He has managed to achieve a great deal in this exactingness. Today, every third officer and warrant officer on the submarine has a master combat qualification. A complete interchangeability has been worked out for the stations. Many of the submariners have mastered associated specialties in addition to their primary ones.

They were returning to base early in the morning when day was breaking above the hills. Light waves, flushed by the sun were hitting the piers. The sea

gulls were raising a hubbub, alarmed by the sudden appearance of the missile carrier. As usual, the vessel was quickly moored. As usual, they had returned victorious. And the commander's report to the senior officer was routine. But behind all of this ordinariness was the commander's talent of Captain 1st Rank V. Samson and his selfless devotion to the cause.

12567

CSO: 1801/021

NAVAL FORCES

TRAINING OF LINE OFFICER FOR COMMAND DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 84 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 1st Rank N. Remizov and Captain 2d Rank A. Kolesnikov: "Two Attacks"]

[Text] The sonar signal, initially barely audible and then strong, intrusive, with a metallic tone, left no doubt in Warrant Officer V. Tychina's assumptions. The team leader of the sonarmen determined the parameters of the operating station and reported to the commander. The submarine's weapons crew, headed by Captain Lieutenant V. Marinkin, identified the type of station and its carrier: an antisubmarine (ASW) ship.

Shortly after, the sonarman reported that he was hearing several more sonar signals. According to their operating characteristics and the strength of the signals, one could conclude that the submarine had not yet been detected; however, it was located in the search area of the surface ships. Captain Lieutenant V. Marinkin gave the order to calculate the course and speed out of the detection zone. "We don't have time," the report followed. Then the commander made the decision to break through the formation of ASW ships by attacking one of them and by using sonar noise equipment.

However, Captain Lieutenant Marinkin is not actually the commander, but the senior assistant. But in this battle he was performing the duties of the commander and was called upon to perform a task which senior assistants usually do not encounter. But this did not disturb the officer. On the contrary, he always strove for a test of strength in the most difficult situations. Quite recently Marinkin received clearance to take command of a ship independently and is now trying to master command duties as fully as possible--especially in combat.

Vladimir Marinkin began serving in this unit as a lieutenant. Initially there was hardly anything which set him apart from his peers; he overcame the initial difficulties, but not immediately. But even then he demonstrated industriousness and perseverance. No one was surprised that in due time he established for himself a reputation as one of the unit's best navigators. He was considered as promising officer, striving and able to look into his future. The officer's socialist obligations speak graphically and convincingly of this. It has become a rule for Marinkin to master the

position one level above the position held. Thus, he passed admission to senior assistant ahead of schedule and, having become a senior assistant, is developing in himself command skills and qualities. Today is precisely the case.

The ASW ships were approaching the submarine and the captain lieutenant cautiously, so as not to be detected, maneuvered, taking up a position suitable for attack and breakthrough.

"Torpedo attack!" the senior assistant's voice slightly gave away his nervousness.

Continuously tracking all "enemy" ships, the weapons crew primarily focused their attention on the closest target, working up the firing data on it.

There were no changes in the actions of the surface ships. That means the attack is going successfully. "Away!" came the short command. The torpedoes headed toward the target. Simultaneously, interference was generated for the "enemy" sonars. The attack proved to be a surprise and precise, which also enabled the submarine to break through the formation of ASW ships.

But the battle continues. Having completed maneuvering for evasive action from pursuit after the attack, the submarine turned to a course to search for the convoy following the ASW ships. In so doing, it was very important to choose the proper depth of submergence, taking into account the hydrology of the sea in the search area.

Earlier we had the opportunity to go out to sea on this ship. You should have seen how attentively the senior assistant understood his commander's style and himself tried most often to take his part in a training battle. The fruits of this are being felt now. The weapons crew, headed by Captain Lieutenant Marinkin, detected the convoy and identified the primary target competently and quickly. The attack in the simulator was also successful, where the described actions were also conducted. Above all, here the special psychological burden which a commander experiences at sea and in battle is absent.

Nevertheless, this battle of the senior assistant has a great value as an indication of the high rhythm of the officer's professional growth, the ability to shoulder high obligations and carry them out with credit, which, among other things, has a great educational importance for subordinates. We observed a similar battle towards the end of the winter training period. In the time that had passed, senior assistant Marinkin has developed considerably. His journey from the simulator to the ocean promises to be a quick one. This is precisely how a line officer must be trained, striving to become commander.

12567

CSO: 1801/021

SPECIAL TROOPS

MOTOR VEHICLE REPAIR WORKERS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by V. Grishin, chairman of the territorial trade union committee, Southern Group of Forces: "The Labor Collective's Honor"]

[Text] Ye. Vasilyevskiy, a [civilian] worker of the Soviet Army, gave G. Rummyantsev, the testers' foreman, a puzzled look. Rummyantsev had invited him to the test bench where a motor engine, assembled by Vasilyevskiy, was being tested. As they were approaching, Vasilyevskiy remarked disapprovingly: "Well, what happened now?"

Rummyantsev led the worker to the test bench and pointed to the generator's fastening bolt. Noticing that a screw had unwound and was not secured with cotters, Vasilyevskiy remarked impassively: "This happens around here. We'll just tighten it up right away."

It was the easy way in which Vasilyevskiy had uttered these words that angered Rummyantsev, the trade union committee chairman, more than anything:

"Did you ever consider how all of this might have turned out? Don't forget that we are not just any workers, but workers of the Soviet Army."

Vasilyevskiy, however, could not understand why the trade union committee chairman was giving him such a hard time. For this reason, Rummyantsev brought up this incident at a trade union meeting. The mention of what had happened angered many of the shop's workers. The conversation then turned to worker's honor and the feeling of pride for the collective in which one worked. The main thing they were getting at was irreconcilability with anyone who reflects badly on the work of the repair enterprise through his careless work.

But aren't we being a bit too severe in our criticism? Aren't we laying it on heavy when we say that the good name of an entire collective can suffer because of one negligent worker? I am not going to hide the fact that a similar opinion was sounded at the meeting. Someone stated that the number of complaints from the army about repaired vehicles dropped several fold in the past 3 years.

But there still are complaints, aren't there? It seems that precisely because of this, high quality, conscientious work had not yet become the norm and a requirement of every member of the collective. Dozens of people repair a motor

vehicle. Sometimes, a defect occurs which is not detected even when the motor vehicle is being tested. It is discovered only when the vehicle is already being utilized. The entire collective is then blemished. It was this idea, dealing with the collective responsibility of the repair workers for the work of the enterprise, which was emphasized by many trade union members at the meeting.

It is noteworthy that this conversation took place during the reports and elections campaign in the trade union organizations. The enterprise's managers and the party committee are striving to direct this campaign towards increasing the responsibility of the trade union committees for fulfilling production plans, expanding socialist competition, complying with collective agreements, and creating the proper conditions for the workers' labor, daily life, and recreation.

The important tasks which the party places on the trade unions cannot be accomplished without the search for new forms and methods in educational efforts. And I will not be wrong if I say that one of the basic methods is effective socialist competition. But it will be effective only if, figuratively speaking, it reaches the spirits of the people and is conducted informally.

I remember a story told to me by the chief of the Quality Control Branch [OTK]--Major L. Aleksseyenko. Somehow, he managed to place a motor, assembled by Yu. Ampilov, a young worker, on a bench to be tested. A defect was discovered immediately: the sleeves had not been fastened tightly enough during assembly. Ampilov himself explained that he had rushed the work. Actually, it was just plain carelessness. But Ampilov was not considered to be a poor worker. With regard to the names of competition participants, his was not in last place, as they say. It was just this fact that alerted the trade union aktiv.

Rumors soon began to circulate about this incident. People, however, were not only talking about this single, unpleasant occurrence. Trade union activists, led by M. Gil, asked an even more comprehensive question: Why not put the collective factor in first place when assessing the results of labor competition? Did the enterprise suffer because of you? The brigade? Shop? Unfortunately, these questions are often left unanswered. But it is precisely these questions which are the main moral basis for competition. It is well that the motor vehicle repairmen understand this.

When I visit this plant, I am always pleased to notice that worker initiative also finds the corresponding support of the enterprise's managers, party organization and specialists.

With such an approach to business, competition really becomes a major incentive. How could it be otherwise? Precisely just such a situation interests the workers themselves in discovering reserves and exposing the shortcomings which prevent them from working more productively. Since this is true, they were successful at the plant in increasing significantly the labor output per worker and creating in the collective an atmosphere of irreconcilability with those who violate worker discipline and are responsible for defective work.

Unfortunately, all too often we have to hear how workers and employees fail to go to the trade union committee for assistance. Here and there people think that the trade union committee allegedly does not solve anything and that everything depends on management. This is basically an erroneous concept! And it is especially prevalent where trade union committees consistently stand up for the rights of the workers.

With regard to this, I would especially like to say something about the so-called work after work, i.e., about overtime. Why keep it a secret? Many managers and trade union committee chairmen consider overtime unavoidable. But is that actually so? More often than not, it would seem that this is not the case. People often try to compensate through overtime any damage caused by disorganization, negligence on the job or with supply and support, or the laxity of other workers. This overtime is then described as "worker initiative" and "enthusiasm." Similar ideas should also be evaluated principally the same way.

Today, one of the main trends in the intensification of production is the reconstruction of operating enterprises and the introduction of the latest equipment and technology. As a result, the approach to the organization of socialist competition has also changed. The motor vehicle repairmen have already taken the first steps in this direction. A new form of creative personal plans has been worked out on the initiative of the trade union committee. This form envisions increased requirements for mid-level specialists, the immediate organizers of production.

The motor vehicle repairmen place the enhancement of the level, of production, understood in its broadest sense, in the forefront of competition. In the beginning, they introduced a most basic element to competition: cleanliness in the workplace. A movement developed "for the model workplace." All this, however, is only one facet of the effort. After all, the concept "culture of production" is made up of other elements as well. Turning out production of high quality, i.e., for the least expense, is the basic element of this concept.

Motor vehicle repairmen, like all labor collectives in the group of forces, are making a special effort for the 40th anniversary of our Great Victory with a lot of enthusiasm. Keeping this universal memory alive is our tribute to the heroes and protectors, fallen and still alive, who defended the freedom and independence of the Motherland and saved the world from fascism. This year's competition is permeated by a great and radiantly moral idea. It is an issue of honor on the part of every worker collective to greet this celebrated day in the life of our country with a special effort, new successes in achieving the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, and an early fulfillment of the tasks of the 11th Five-Year Plan, and to transform this memory, sacred to us all, into a powerful creative force.

12247

CSO: 1801/2

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

CREATIVE WORK IN MILITARY SCHOOLS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 84 pp 30-31

[Article by A. Safronov and A. Kiselyov]

[Text]

The number of innovators in the Soviet Union is growing with every passing year, and the effectiveness of technical novelties produced by them is heightening. Inventions and efficiency proposals in the national economy allow billions of roubles to be economised.

The record has shown that innovations made by public creative associations — design and technological bureaux and combined creative brigades (groups) — are of special value. Such associations today unite more than one and a half million members. In 1982 they accounted for nearly one third of the total number of inventions and innovations used in the national economy; as to their effectiveness, they are by far superior to those made by individual inventors.

Collective creative activity in the Soviet Armed Forces is continually gaining in scope. Thus, over 300 brigades and groups were set up in 1982 in the Order of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District. These teams developed nearly 50% of all the proposals which had come in during the year. Hundreds of creative

groups and two public design bureaux of the Order of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet advanced and implemented over 2,400 efficiency proposals during the same year. In the Order of the Red Banner Byelorussian Military District more than 30% of the thematic assignments have been completed by creative collectives.

As a rule, innovators' creative cooperation and mutual assistance allows most urgent and complicated tasks to be solved at a high technical level. This cooperation is particularly fruitful in units and formations where the principle of forming public creative associations is well thought out, where they deal with problems of vital practical significance, and where they are given all-round support of the commanders and committees for inventions. A public design bureau in the Order of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District may well serve as an illustration. The bureau includes active innovators from among servicemen of different specialities.

The design bureau in ques-

tion has accomplished rather complicated and pressing tasks. Thus, it developed equipment for a training command post, an operator's simulator, and a general-purpose portable TV set; besides, military innovators have put forward quite a few other proposals aimed at improving the training base and maintaining combat equipment better.

Collective creative work is highly effective at repair enterprises. Several teams working at one of them tackle most vital repair jobs. They put into effect more than half the proposals coming to the enterprise. These teams are headed by proficient design and process engineers who are highly experienced in innovation matters. Such teams are set up under the motto "Engineering Support for Workers' Initiative." The team's innovators tie in their creative plans with those of the Council of the All-Union Innovators' and Inventors' Society at the enterprise. The plan is approved by the chief engineer. In the event of particularly complicated thematic assignments agreements on cooperation are concluded between engineers and workers — members of creative groups.

Among the numerous innovations introduced by these teams are a unit to secure sensors for measuring vibrations arising in the housing of a running engine, a device for fine tuning in measuring the rotation speed of a mechanism, an electric mixer to prepare pastes and glues, and a stand for testing special instruments.

Apart from developing their own proposals, innovation teams are doing much to implement technical novelties borrowed from various infor-

mation sources, especially from the USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievements, which is rightfully called a school of advanced experience.

Collective creative activity plays a particularly important role in military educational establishments. The effect derived from the work of innovation teams can hardly be overestimated. At the Nakhimov Black Sea Fleet Higher Naval School, for instance, 33 groups developed 434 proposals in one year, and at the Popov Higher Naval Radioelectronics School 20 teams handled 190 thematic assignments.

At the Zhukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy great success has been achieved by a supernumerary combined creative brigade, which has nearly 25 inventor's certificates to its credit. Many of these inventions are used in the process of instruction. The brigade has designed a standard aerodynamics classroom provided with operating models.

Students' design bureaux at the majority of military educational establishments have been most active in theoretical research. Headed by experienced specialists, generally from the teaching staff, they are engaged in many important engineering problems both in the interest of the forces and for improving the teaching process and the quality of research work. These design bureaux are also of high educational value, because students working in them acquire profound engineering knowledge and learn to deal with various problems in a creative way.

For example, the design bureau at the Mikhail Kalinin Higher Signals School in Kiev has been assigned the mission to promote a deep study of the subjects on the curriculum,

mastering of independent research methods and skills, and the development of inventions and innovations. The Command has set up an inter-departmental design bureau at the school, which tackles problems calling for joint effort of different specialists, and bureaux at individual chairs with more specific tasks.

Every year students' design bureaux at the school yield dozens of innovations, some of which are awarded inventor's certificates and are used extensively in the national economy and in the Armed Forces. Thus, a student design bureau has worked out a system for automatic control of electroslag welding process and for the protection of metals against overheating. The system ensures higher reliability as compared with the

existing optical and TV systems. Its originators have been awarded the gold medal of the USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievements. Innovators at this school have also developed a simulator for operators' automatic training to acquire skills in controlling keyboard apparatus, which allows the individual abilities of each operator to be taken into account and the curriculum to be drawn up automatically. The simulator will soon go into serial production.

It shall be noted in conclusion that public reviews of innovations by students' design bureaux at higher educational establishments are held in the USSR twice a year. Design bureaux at military schools and academies also take part in these reviews. Many of them have become prize winners.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," No 8, 1984

CSO: 1801/51

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

10 Dec 1984